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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
One of the most enduring and enigmatic issues in the history of philosophy and
theology is the mind-body problem. The attempt to answer the question concerning the
existence and nature of the human soul has been a dominant element ofmany of the main
philosophical and theological systems in history. Consequently, the mind-body problem
has generated much debate, and the latter half of the twentieth century is not exempt.
The modem mind-body problem may be defined as the attempt to understand "the
relation between a man's conscious life of thought and sensation, and the physical events
in and around his body."' This thesis will attempt to critically interact with some of the
primary and secondary literature on the modem mind-body problem focusing on three
key issues, and offer an evaluation of the positions found in the literature in light of the
composite dualism of Thomas Aquinas.
Most of the attempts at solving the mind-body problem in history may be divided
into two categories: materialism and dualism. The first category, materialism, may be
separated into two positions - hard materialism and soft materialism. Hard materialism
maintains that the only types of substances to exist are physical substances. Both
' Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 7. As stated, Richard
Swinburne's definition of the mind-body debate seems to be self-referential, in that it implies a dualistic
conception of human nature. In contrast, The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy elects to approach the
subject in a more cautious manner, defining the modem mind-body problem as the question of "whether
mental phenomena are physical phenomena and, if not, how they relate to physical phenomena" (597).
philosophers and scientists, such as Bertrand Russell and Francis Crick have championed
this position. According to hard materialism, all mental events that occur to a person are
caused by and are reducible to physical events. Bertrand Russell wrote that mankind "is
a part of nature, not something contrasted with nature. His thoughts and his bodily
movements follow the same laws that describe the motions of stars and atoms." Hence,
since Russell believed that "mental phenomena seem to be bound up with material
structure", he concluded that all "that constitutes a person is a series of experiences
connected by memory and by certain similarities of the sort we call habit."'* This type of
metaphysical materialism or physicalism is often referred to as the Identity Theory,
which "claims that types of sensations are identical with types of brain processes."^ In
other words, all mental events are to be understood as brain events.
Soft materialism agrees with the hard materialist position that only physical
substances exist. However, there is a major distinction between hard materialism and
soft materialism that needs to be addressed. While the hard materialist maintains that all
mental events may be reduced to and described by physical events (i.e. brain events), the
soft materialist asserts that some physical entities also have mental properties, such as
sensing physical pain or observing an object of a certain color and shape. However, it is
important to note that the soft materialist insists on the reality of mental events, though
^ Bertrand Russell, Why I am Not A Christian: And Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects.
(New York: Touchstone, 1957), 48.
^ Ibid., 50.
'
Ibid., 89.
^ Robert Audi, general editor. The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 600.
3they it would not assert that mental events transcend the physical components of the
brain.
Dualism, the second major position in the modem mind-body debate, proposes
that the human person is comprised of two distinct substances, a physical substance,
which is the body, and an immaterial substance, which is the mind or soul. These two
substances coincide with the body and the mind, or soul. This type of dualism, most
often referred to as substance dualism, was the position of the seventeenth century
philosopher Rene Descartes. The main tenet ofCartesian dualism is that the essential
nature of the human person is not the body, but the mind or soul. Descartes outlines this
position in his Meditations on First Philosophy.
My essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It is tme that I
may have (or, to anticipate, that I certainly have) a body that is very closely joined
to me. But nevertheless, on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of
myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other I
have a clear and distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended non
thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my
body and can exist without it.
However, the position of Thomas Aquinas on what constitutes a human being is
different from those recorded above. Rather, Aquinas takes an intermediary position,
based largely on Aristotle's anthropology, between the extremes of Platonic and
Cartesian dualism, and the metaphysical materialism ofRussell, Searle, and Crick.
Davies writes that Aquinas "denies that people are essentially incorporeal. So he is not a
Dualist. But neither does he think that people are nothing but collections ofphysical
* Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. 2 vols., Trans. John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2:54.
processes. So he is not a PhysicaUst either. For him, people are composite individuals."^
Therefore, it is accurate to assert that Aquinas held to a type of dualistic understanding of
the human person. However, it must also be asserted that Aquinas denied the notion that
he read in Plato, and which was eventually to become Descartes' position, that the soul or
mind alone constitutes the essence of an individual. The type of composite dualism (or
Thomistic dualism) for which Aquinas argued, and that this thesis will defend, has two
major elements. First, Thomistic dualism states that the two substances (body and soul)
interact in an elemental maimer to the extent that events which affect the body also effect
the soul, and conversely. Second, Thomistic dualism asserts that both the body and the
soul are essential for a human being to be complete. Aquinas held "that we are
mental/physical units, where 'mental' and 'physical' are not simply reducible to each
o
other." In this manner, one major consequence ofAquinas' s position is also shared by
Cartesian substance dualism: that despite the destruction of the body, the soul is not
destroyed.
Statement of the Problem
What relevance does Thomistic dualism have for the modem mind-body debate
currently being discussed in the fields of philosophy and theology? Specifically, to what
extent, can Aquinas's explanation of the mind-body problem inform this debate in
regards to three primary issues conceming human nature: human consciousness, human
freedom, and human destiny.
^ Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 209.
That is, Aquinas is not a dualist under the Cartesian conception of substance dualism.
' Ibid.
5Review of Related Literature
The amount of resource material available on the mind-body problem is
extensive. The proposed solutions to the primary issue surrounding the mind-body
problem seem to equal the number of scholars who have written on the subject. Most
large-scale philosophical and theological systems dedicate a portion to this issue, or refer
to it throughout. Despite this wealth of literature, little attention in recent years has been
given to Aquinas's proposed solution to the mind-body problem, and how his theory may
serve to illuminate specific issues in the debate.
While a wealth of secondary literature exists on the mind-body problem in
general, relatively few works have attempted to interpret Aquinas's position in light of
the issues of human nature, human consciousness, human freedom, and human destiny.
Therefore, the primary and secondary literature that relates to the focus of this thesis has
been divided into three categories. The first category consists of expositions of
Aquinas's philosophy and theology that define and illustrate his proposed solution to the
mind-body problem. The second category contains various proposed materialistic
solutions to the mind-body debate, often referred to under the terminology of hard and
soft materialism. The final category is comprised of several proposed dualistic, or
immaterial, solutions to the mind-body debate, which differ significantly enough from
Aquinas's substance dualism to merit being placed in a different category.
Primary Literature on Aquinas
Aquinas wrote within a number of disciplines, and there is a considerable amount
of literature that interprets his work. However, for a proper understanding of his
6proposed composite-dualism solution to the mind-body problem, this study will focus
primary attention on Aquinas's anthropology, epistemology, and psychology, as found in
his magnum opus ofphilosophy and theology, the Summa Theologiae and, when
applicable, the Summa Contra Gentiles. An annotated version ofAquinas's Summa
Theologiae by Peter J. Kreeft, entitled The Summa of the Summa. will also be utilized.
Other minor philosophical texts will be referred to as needed. These will be the primary
materials from which Aquinas's composite dualism will be outlined and explained.
Secondary Literature on Aquinas
As noted above, there exists a large amount of secondary material that expounds
Aquinas's philosophical and theological positions. These materials will be consulted and
relied upon as attempts to reconcile Aquinas's medieval position with more modem
engagements of the mind-body problem. Primary among these are Brian Davies' The
Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Francis Selman's Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Tmth, Peter
J. Kreeft's A Summa of the Summa, F. C. Copleston's Aquinas, and Etienne Gilson's The
Philosophv of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Primary Literature on the Mind-Body Debate
Several works in recent years have warranted considerable attention from
philosophers and theologians interested in the mind-body debate. Among these have
been several proposed materialistic and monistic solutions offered by members of the
philosophical and scientific communities. For the materialistic position in the
philosophical community John R. Searle's monograph and article writings will be often
7consulted. Chief among these is his monograph Minds, Brains and Science. His
informative article "The Mystery of Consciousness" in The New York Review will also
be consulted. Searle maintains that a materialistic interpretation of the mind-body
problem is not inconsistent with the evidence that both mental and physical phenomena
exist. He writes, "[njaive mentalism and naive physicalism are perfectly consistent with
each other. Indeed, as far as we know anything about how the world works, they are not
only consistent, they are both true."^ Searle's work on this subject is well written and
cogently argued. In light of the implications for human consciousness, freedom and
destiny that result from Searle's position, his work will receive a large amount of serious
consideration in this thesis.
For the materialistic position from the scientific community recent works of
mathematician Roger Penrose and Biochemist Francis Crick will be examined. Penrose's
works Shadows of the Mind and The Large, the Small and the Human Mind will be
valuable resources for this study. Penrose proposes that Quantum Mechanics may serve
as the theory which will finally explain the seemingly contradictory division between
brain events, the physical and electro-chemical processes that occur in the brain, and the
mental events that seem to dualists to be separate and distinct from brain events.
Francis Crick's recent book. The Astonishing Hypothesis, will also be examined.
Crick proposes a simple and strong biological and mechanical understanding of the
phenomena usually philosophically described as the "mind." For Crick the mental life of
an individual human being exists within and is completely explainable by the physical
processes that exist within the human brain. Crick's bold "hypothesis" deserves
considerable attention in light of the three issues that will be explored by this thesis. For,
' John R. Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 27.
if true, Crick's position would have serious consequences for the Christian understanding
of two of the issues being considered in this study, human freedom and human destiny.
Behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity will be
examined in Chapter 4 because his view of the nature of humanity has particular
relevance to the issue of the problem of human freedom. His views are important as to
how one understands the role ofmorality and experience in relation to the mind-body
problem.
For the substance dualistic position in the philosophical community, Richard
Swinburne's The Evolution of the Soul will be considered. As a substance dualist,
Swinburne concludes that though the soul is an immaterial substance and separate from
the body, "no justified general account of the nature of the soul" can exist.
'� Indeed, "all
that we can say is that under normal mundane conditions the functioning of the soul
requires the functioning of the body."'' This position is significantly different than that
ofAquinas, who maintained that, because the soul is the form of the body, the soul is by
nature immortal. Swinburne's work will be one of those utilized in order to determine if
the natural immortality of the soul, which Swinburne states is problematic under the
Thomistic model, is a plausible alternative to those of substance dualism and
metaphysical materialism.
Theoretical Framework and Definitions for the Study
Much of the scholarly work on the mind-body problem has gone into properly
Swinburne, 10.
" Ibid.
9defining the terms and ideas that make up the debate. This thesis will not dispute the
terminology around which the mind-body problem has been argued. The definitions of
such key terms as "hard materialism," "soft materialism," and "substance dualism" have
been provided above. For the purposes of this study, the following definitions will be
used for words and concepts such as "mind," "mental event," "brain event," and "soul."
Clearly, not all of those involved in the modem mind-body debate agree on how
these key terms are to be defined. For a materialist, "mind" may be defined as the
phenomena of "the sequence of thoughts, feelings, and experiences, whether conscious or
unconscious, that go to make up our mental life."'^ Hence, mental events are to be
understood as "events which involve the instantiation ofmental properties" (e.g. Peter
experiencing pain yesterday at noon).'^ "Brain event," on the other hand, is defined as
the physical process that occurs in the brain of an individual when that individual
experiences certain thoughts, sensations or feelings. A dualist, on the other hand, defines
mind as a substance which is capable of and engages in these activities, not just merely
the activities themselves. It will be argued in Chapter 2 that, for Thomistic dualism, the
term "soul" is synonymous with the term mind, and is understood as the immaterial
substance which, along with the material body, comprises a human individual.
"Substance dualism" was defined above, but will be repeated here. Briefly, substance
dualism maintains that a human being is comprised of two distinct substances, the
physical substance of the body, and the immaterial substance of the soul. One cmcial
Searle, 11.
Swinburne, 7.
10
aspect of substance dualism is that the soul is the essential aspect of a person, despite the
condition of the physical body.
Methodology of the Study
In regards to the approach that this thesis will use to study the relevance of
Thomistic dualism for the modem mind-body debate, it is important to briefly explain the
methodology to be used for this thesis. Overall, this thesis will explore Thomistic
dualism, and its influence on the modem mind-body debate, from a philosophical
standpoint, and critically engage other interpretations of the mind-body problem. When
applicable, the discipline of philosophical theology, and perhaps systematic theology,
will also be used. The reason for this is because of the philosophical and theological
nature of the modem mind-body debate itself, and the three issues identified for particular
attention by this thesis.''*
Organization of the Study
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the problem to
which this thesis is dedicated, defined the key terms relevant to this study, and has briefly
categorized the relevant primary and secondary literature on the mind-body problem.
Chapter 2 will examine Thomas Aquinas's approach to the mind-body issue, and will
present an exposition of the philosophical and theological foundations for his composite-
A word should be given regarding the writing and stylistic techniques used by this thesis. Due to the
time, language, and spelling differences between many of the primary and secondary source material,
gender-inclusive language, spelling variances and other related distinctions within quotations will remain
undisturbed. The reason for this is twofold. First, it is in the best interest of scholarship to allow the
authors to write candidly and in a manner in which they are, or were, accustomed. Second, this is the most
likely method in which to avoid confusion in particularly technical areas and discussions.
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dualistic understanding of humanity. The following three chapters will examine how
Thomistic composite-dualism informs the three current issues in the modem mind-body
debate identified by this thesis: human consciousness, human freedom, and human
destiny.
Justification for the Study
There are four primary justifications for this thesis. First, many recent studies
regarding the mind-body problem have been dominated by a dogmatic materialistic
interpretation. Members of the scientific community who have begun investigating the
brain and how it functions have written a large portion of this material. The most
prominent of these have been Roger Penrose and Francis Crick. Whereas Penrose wishes
to argue philosophically that quantum theory solves the mind-body problem, the
predominant assumption that Crick makes is that the philosophical notion of 'mind'
should be understood entirely by the physical processes in the various nervous systems
and brain. Consequently, Crick has completely ignored and abandoned the possibility of
a dualistic understanding of the relationship between someone's 'mind' and physical
body.'^ Characterisfic of this bias against philosophy's ability to add to the discussion
conceming the mind-body problem is a recent statement by ChristofKoch. Attempfing
to illustrate his contempt for philosophical inquiry into the mind-body problem, Koch
quoted Ludwig Wittgenstein: '"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.'"'^
"Whatever the answer, the only sensible way to arrive at it is through detailed scientific research. All
other approaches are little more than whistling to keep our courage up." Francis Crick, The Astonishing
Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. (New York: Scribner's, 1994), 263.
" John Horgan, "Can Science Explain Consciousness?," Scientific American 271 no. 1 (July 1994), 94.
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Crick also comments, "[pjhilosophers have had such a poor record over the last two
thousand years that they would do better to show a certain modesty rather than the lofty
superiority that they usually display."'^ One of the goals of this thesis is to illustrate that
Thomistic dualism is a more coherent and justifiable posifion than the substance dualist
and materialistic ones that are being currently espoused by the scientific and
philosophical communities.
Second, through their endorsement of the posifion currently popular in the
scientific community, many modem philosophers apparently seem quite satisfied with a
materialisfic understanding of human life. This has often resulted in an unwillingness to
acknowledge that dualism is a philosophically rafional, coherent, and plausible option.
As alluded to above, this has resulted in a certain level of contempt for those who would
propose an inmiaterial solution to the mind-body problem. As Richard Swinbume has
perceived, "[tjhese days one gets a far more sympathetic hearing for arguments to the
existence ofGod than for arguments to the existence of the soul."'^
However, this is not always the case. Many in modem culture have become
dissatisfied with a solely materialistic conception of the world outside and inside, despite
the continuous inroads of modem science's apparent ability to provide a purely physical
explanation of the world. Consequently, many people are returning to a more spiritual
understanding of reality and human nature and experimenting with several so called
"New Age" religions or philosophies. Clearly, there is a large disagreement in modem
Crick, 258. Commenting on such attitudes, John Searle remarks that "the price of having contempt
for philosophy is that you make philosophical mistakes." "The Mystery of Consciousness," The New York
Review, 2 Nov., 1995, 62.
Swinbume, ix.
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society on what constitutes humanity. For these reasons, this study hopes to demonstrate
that the "soul" is an essential component ofhumanity. And, being a necessary aspect of
human existence, the soul must be properly understood in order for life to be fully
enjoyed and have sufficient meaning.
Third, even within the philosophical community, there appears to be a lack of
interest in Thomistic dualism in the current literature on the mind-body debate.'^ hi a
recent issue of Faith and Philosophv dedicated to current trends in the mind-body
problem, Lynne Rudder Baker considers Aquinas's position difficult to "pin down."'^'^
Richard Swinbume, in The Evolution of the Soul, refers to Aquinas only on six
occasions, with all but one of these located in footnotes or appendixes. It is not being
argued that Thomistic dualism should dominate the modem debate. However, in light of
Aquinas's importance in other areas of philosophical and theological thought, it is
reasonable to argue that Aquinas's position and approach to the mind-body problem in
reference to the three primary issues provided above needs to be analyzed. In this way,
the position of this thesis echoes the sentiment of Jacques Maritain when he remarked
that "Thomism is not a museum piece." With the advances in biology, medicine,
physics, and astronomy, it is often believed that large scale advances, the kind that
One extreme example of this modem trend of ignoring the significance ofAquinas is found in Will
Durant's The Story of Philosophv. His only analysis and summarization of the work ofThomas Aquinas is
found in the following passage. "In the thirteenth century all Christendom was startled and stimulated by
Arabic and Jewish translations ofAristotle; but the power of the Church was still adequate to secure,
through Thomas Aquinas and others, the transmogrification of Aristotle into a medieval theologian. The
result was subtlety, but not wisdom." Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of
the Greater Philosophers. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), 82.
^�
Lynne Rudder Baker, "Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?" Faith and Philosophv 12 no. 4
(Oct. 1995), 503.
^'
Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics. (Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer, 1987), 9.
14
dethrone previously held systems, are universal in nature and extend to all areas of
rational inquiry. On the contrary, this study hopes to demonstrate that there exists "a
living Thomism,"^^ and that Thomism, properly understood, "answers modem problems,
both theoretical and practical."^'' Therefore, despite many attempts to minimize the
importance of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas and consider its study
valid only in a purely historical context, this thesis will endeavor to illustrate that "tmth
cannot be subjected to a chronological test."^'*
Finally, the three issues chosen by this thesis - human consciousness, human
freedom, and human destiny - are not important only to Thomistic dualism or the current
mind-body debate, but also to the Christian theological message as well. As such, the
study of the mind-body issue within a Thomistic context seems both valid and important.
It is valid for the reasons detailed above. It is important because such study will help
identify and clarify the content of the Christian faith, and provide valid philosophical
justifications to those who hold to what the Christian faith maintains about persons.
Maritain, 10.
" Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 11.
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CHAPTER 2
THE COMPOSITE DUALISM OF THOMAS AQUINAS
A proper understanding of the human person was a primary and necessary aspect
of the philosophical and theological enterprise of Thomas Aquinas. One reason for this
was because of the diversity of opinions on this subject in the intellectual history of
humanity. Indeed, the intellectual history of humanity contains a plethora of viewpoints
on the essence of the human person. A cursory reading of the major thinkers from the
ancient world to the present would present various conceptions of human consciousness,
human freedom, and human destiny. Thomas Aquinas's understanding of the human
person is radically different from that ofmany positions found in the ancient and the
modem world. One of the most significant differences is Aquinas's conception of the
human soul. Indeed, the uncommon composite dualism ofAquinas has specific and
profound implications for the proper understanding of human consciousness, human
freedom, and human destiny - issues vigorously debated in the current literature
involving the mind-body problem.
This chapter will examine Aquinas's philosophical understanding of the dualistic
nature of the human person, which is that a human being is comprised of both a body and
a soul. This will be accomplished by providing an exposition ofAquinas's position,
which will also identify the type of dualism Aquinas argues for, and how it is different
from other dualistic accounts. This will be followed by reflecting in a preliminary way
16
on how Aquinas's position has implications for the philosophical and theological
understanding of human consciousness, human freedom and human destiny.
Since many ofAquinas's convictions conceming human consciousness, human
freedom, and human destiny directly pertain to his understanding of the human soul, a
systematic and philosophical overview of his composite dualism is necessary. In order to
facilitate an understanding of how Thomistic dualism is pertinent to the three issues in the
mind-body debate selected for this thesis, this chapter will focus primarily on Aquinas's
conception of the human soul. The first portion of this chapter will endeavor to identify
and clarify the main elements ofAquinas's conception of the human soul and its relation
to the human body. First, Aquinas's definition of the human soul will be examined and
outlined. Second, two key properties attributed by Aquinas to the human soul will be
investigated. Third, two specific powers which Aquinas assigns to the human soul will
be explored.
Prior to a discussion conceming the properties and powers of the human soul,
Aquinas's definition and classificafion of the soul in general, and the human soul in
particular, is required. This will illustrate the special nature of the human soul and the
distinction between the human soul and other types of souls.
The Soul in General
Aquinas provides three key concepts that characterize his nofion of the soul in
general. The first concept involves a necessary disfinction to be made in order to
understand properly Aquinas's understanding of the nature and powers of the human
soul. To begin, Aquinas follows the tradition of Aristotle and defines the soul into three
17
categories. These are the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul.' These
distinctions represent the predominant view held in the ancient and medieval world until
the seventeenth century when Descartes argued that only human being have souls and
animals were unconscious automata.
The first type, the vegetative soul, Aquinas contends, is common to all beings that
have life, since "every animate thing, in some way, moves itself."^ According to
Aquinas, the second type, the sensitive soul, is evidenced by the operations performed
through corporeal sense organs."* Thomistic dualism would identify the sensitive soul as
the type belonging to animals. Aquinas argues that the third type, the rational soul, is
unique and contains the qualities and properties of the both the vegetative and sensitive
souls. However, Aquinas is careful to add that in a human being the sensitive soul, the
rational soul, and the vegetative soul "are numerically one soul."^ This point will be
given a fuller explanation in the next section. Further, Aquinas argues, the rational soul
exceeds the corporeal nature of the being. This is because, for Aquinas, the rational soul
is necessarily incorporeal and subsistent - that is, the soul is not to be equated with the
body, and the soul has its own separate existence from the body.^ "We must conclude,"
Aquinas writes, "that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is
' Cf. De Anima II, 2, 4.
^ Richard Swinbume, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 183.
^ST I, 78, I.
' Ibid.
' ST I, 76, 3.
*STI, 75, 2.
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something incorporeal and subsistent."^ Consequently, under Aquinas's composite
dualism, due to the rational soul's nature as a separate substance, it is possible for the
human (rational) soul to exist apart from the human body.
Aquinas maintains that this classification of the soul in general into three kinds or
types is justified by the actions of each living being that exists on earth. For Aquinas, all
living things have souls, though not necessarily the same type. This is because, for
Aquinas, a soul is observed and defined through its actions. The reason for this is simple.
If the body of a being was all that was necessary for life, then "every body would be a
Q
living thing." Therefore, according to Aquinas, since not all things are alive, the body
alone cannot be a sufficient for life. Of course, this is not to say that a soul is all that is
necessary for a human body to have life. Certainly, a body must not be damaged,
through illness or injury, to such an extent that the body cannot function as a living
organism.
The second concept concerns Aquinas's definition of the soul in general as "the
first principle of life in those things which in our judgment live."^ Aquinas identifies two
actions by which life may be sufficiently demonstrated: knowledge and movement. It is
interesting to note that Aquinas responds to this notion by stating that the pre-Socratic
philosophers considered the principle of these actions - knowledge and movement - to be
something corporeal. Hence, Aquinas would consider modem materialistic concepts of
the mind-body issue to be "a reversion to a very primitive philosophy.""^ In order to
^ST I, 75,2.
"ST I, 75, 1.
' Ibid.
Peter J. Kreeft, ed., Summa of the Summa. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 244.
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demonstrate the validity (strength) ofAquinas's position, each of these actions will be
briefly examined.
In regards to knowledge, Aquinas understands it as an operation of the soul. For
humans, like the lower animals, all knowledge is mediated through the senses, but is
made intelligible to a human individual by the soul, which has the power of cognitive
understanding. Aquinas calls this power the active intellect." In regards to movement,
Aquinas describes the principle of action as the soul. However, Aquinas does not
consider every principle of vital action to be a soul. Aquinas provides two reasons for
this assertion. First, if every principle of vital action were a soul, then the eye, which is
the principle of vision, would be a soul. Second, if every principle of vital action were a
1
soul, Aquinas adds, all material bodies would be living things. But observation shows
that not all material bodies provide evidence of knowledge and movement. Hence, "the
soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body."'^ Therefore,
"it is the first principle of life which we call the soul."''*
The final concept is Aquinas's understanding of the soul as the form of the body
which it animates. It is important to note that Aquinas makes an explicit distinction
between the Platonic dualistic nofion of the soul as the motor of the body,'^ which was
popular in his day because of the influence ofAugustinian theology and is popular today
because of the influence of Cartesian philosophy of the mind, and his dualistic position.
" ST I, 79,4.
ST, 175, 1.
Ibid.
" Ibid.
In Phaedo 81 Plato describes the soul as being imprisoned or entombed within the body.
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Aquinas follows Aristotle's conviction that the soul is the form of the body. This concept
is closely related to the second. For Aquinas, the difference between animate (living)
bodies and inanimate (dead) bodies was not based on the disposition of a corporeal organ,
or the status of any other material thing. Rather, it was the presence of the soul that
provided the being its life and animated it. For Aquinas, therefore, the soul, being the
form of the body, is the very life of the body.
The Human Soul in Particular
In moving from Aquinas's concept of the soul in general to the human soul in
particular, it should be noted that these three concepts might also be utilized to
characterize the human soul. Aquinas's characterization of the human soul in particular
may be explained by examining three points.
First, as stated above, the human soul is an example of the highest class of the
three types of souls - the rational soul - and also contains the properties of the vegetative
and sensitive soul. Once again, it is important to note that Aquinas did not believe that
the human soul is a composite of three souls. Etienne Gilson, commenting on this
important aspect ofThomistic dualism, stated that
the intellectual soul contains virtually the sensitive soul, since it has all that the
sensitive soul possesses and more besides; but is does not contain the sensitive
soul in the sense that we can distinguish in it two different souls.
Accordingly, Aquinas maintains that the rational soul provides the person "nourishment,
sensation, and local movement; and likewise our understanding."*' Therefore, Aquinas
Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. (New York: Amo Press, 1979), 214-215.
'^ST I, 76, 1.
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asserts, in contrast to Plato's position,'^ "we must conclude that in man the sensitive soul,
the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul."*^
Second, as the first living principle of life of the human person, the rational soul
provides man his uniquely intellectual character. In other words, for Aquinas, the
uniqueness of the human soul is that it is rational. According to Aquinas, this alone
accounts for a person's intellectual principle.'^^ As Gilson writes, "[t]he act proper to an
intellectual soul is evidently intellectual knowledge."^*
Third, the idea of the rational soul being the form of the human body was
intended by Aquinas to preserve the idea of the unity of the human individual. For if the
soul were simply that which caused the body to move, as Platonic dualism asserts, then,
Aquinas writes,
it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which
the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. If, however, the
intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form ... it is impossible
for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.^^
To substantiate this Aquinas points to the idea that the substantial form "gives being
absolutely." Since, in contrast to the substantial form, an accidental form of a thing is
made and not generated absolutely, an accidental form cannot "make a thing to be
absolutely."^^
Cf. Plato's Timaeus 69.
" ST I, 76, 3.
^� ST I, 76, 1.
^' Gilson, 208.
^2 ST I, 76, 4.
Ibid.
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Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another
substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it
would follow that the soul does not give being absolutely, and consequently that it
is not the substantial form; and so at the advent of the soul there would not be
absolute but only relative generation, nor at its removal absolute corruption, all of
which is clearly false.^^
Because of this, Aquinas asserts, "it is impossible for there to be in man another
substantial form besides the intellectual soul."^^ As a result, Aquinas concludes that the
human body and the human or rational soul together make one substance. Aquinas's
explanation of this deserves to be quoted in full.
It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be
held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it
without the body, because in that case all the operations which are attributed to
man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper
to a thing is that thing; therefore that which performs the operations of a man is
man. But it has been shown above that sensation is not the operation of the soul
only. Since, then, sensation is an operation ofman, though not proper to him, it is
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clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body.
Consequently, Aquinas maintains that one aspect of the nature of a human or rational
soul is that it is to be united to a human body. Aquinas observes that since nature cannot
fail in regards to necessary things
therefore, the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of
understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is
not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore the intellectual soul had
to be united to a body which could be an adequate organ of sense.^^
By providing and defending these three concepts, Aquinas characterized the
human soul in three primary ways. First, the human soul is to be understood under the
ST I, 76, 4.
Ibid.
" Ibid.
ST I, 76, 5.
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Aristotelian category of a rational soul. Second, the human soul is the first rational and
intellectual principle of life for the individual. Third, the human soul is not to be
confused with the body, but is to be understood as the form of the body. Aquinas
encapsulates these three concepts by writing that "the difference which constitutes man is
rational, which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore, the
intellectual principle is the form ofman."
Operating with this characterization of the human soul, it is now possible to
investigate several of the main properties of the soul as maintained by Thomistic dualism.
So far, this chapter has demonstrated two key points. First, that Aquinas argued for the
identification of the human soul as a rational soul. Second, that this conviction was based
primarily on the properties that constitute the human soul and the specific powers which
the human soul exhibits. The following portion of this chapter will analyze these two
areas ofAquinas's understanding of the human soul.
The Properties of the Human Soul
Coupled with his characterization of the human soul, Aquinas also identifies
several of its properties. For the purposes of this thesis, two key properties of the human
soul will be considered. The first property is that the human soul is immaterial.
Throughout the section on Anthropology in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas asserts that
the soul "has no matter."^� Aquinas provides two main reasons to defend this belief
First, the soul is immaterial because the soul is the form of the body.
ST I, 76, 1.
ST I, 75, 5.
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Now, though a body may be a principle of life, as the heart is a principle of life in
an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear
that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as
such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a
principle of life.^*
In other words, as it was argued above, if the living principle of life were based on a
material substance, than all material substances would be living. Hence, the soul cannot
be composed ofmaterial. Consequently, Aquinas asserts that the human soul must be
immaterial. Mclnemy writes that the conclusion that "the soul is immaterial follows
from the fact that it is a form, and in that sense all substantial forms are immaterial. "^^
Second, the process by which man acquires knowledge leads to the conclusion that the
human soul is immaterial. Aquinas writes, "the intellectual principle . . . has an operation
per se apart from the body." That is, if the intellectual principle were a body, then it
would be impossible for it to gain knowledge of all other corporeal objects. Aquinas uses
as an illustration a particular liquid - say, water - in a glass vase of a certain color. The
true color of the liquid is blocked from the senses because of the color of the vase is "in
the pupil of the eye" and does not allow the color of the liquid to be seen.^'* Copleston
comments that Aquinas's ground for the assertion of the immateriality of the human soul
is based "on the contention that man exercises psychical activities which are not
intrinsically dependent on a corporeal organ."^^ Aquinas further contends that "[i]f the
^' ST I, 75, 1.
" Ralph Mclnemy, A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas: A Handbook for Peeping Thomists. (Notre
Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1990), 117.
" ST I, 75, 2.
Ibid.
F C. Copleston, Aquinas: An Introduction to the Life and Work of the Great Medieval Thinker,
(London: Penguin Books, 1991), 170.
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intellectual soul were composed ofmatter and form, the forms of things would be
received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual.
"^^ What
Aquinas is alleging is that since the human soul has knowledge of universals, and not just
particulars, the human soul could not be composed of a material substance. Hence, "it is
clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive."^' Therefore,
Aquinas concludes, "the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has
knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition ofmatter."^^
The second property of the human soul is that it is immortal. Aquinas provides
three principle reasons for this assertion. To begin, Aquinas makes a distinction between
two types of corruption -per se (by itself) and accidental. In regards to corruption by
itself, a substance that has existence by itself caimot be corrupted except by itself. Hence,
"it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a
subsistent form to cease to exist."^^ The idea that a subsistent form cannot pass from
being to nonbeing is the first reason why Aquinas considered the human soul to be
immortal. Francis Selman explains this in further detail when he writes, "something no
longer exists when it loses its form but a form cannot lose itself, so what is in itself a
subsistent form cannot be destroyed."'*^ Therefore, since it has already been established
that Aquinas considers the human soul to be a subsistent form, it cannot cease to exist.
The second reason for Aquinas's belief in the immortality of the human soul is based on
ST I, 75, 5.
" ST I, 14, 1.
ST I, 75, 5.
ST I, 75, 6.
^" Francis Selman, Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Truth. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 43.
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his behef in its immateriaUty. For Aquinas, since the human soul is not based on any
material principle, it can survive the death of the body. Aquinas defends this idea on the
basis of the primary source of the human soul - God. Aquinas rejected the argument that
since the souls of brute animals are corruptible - that is, subject to dissolution - it follows
that the souls of humans are corruptible. Rather, Aquinas argues that since the human
soul is a special creation ofGod it follows that the human soul should be immortal."**
"For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human
soul is produced by God.""*^ The third reason for Aquinas's belief in the immortality of
the soul is based on its character of cognitive thought. Mclnemy writes that, according to
Aquinas, "[t]he nature of thinking lifts the human soul, although it is the substantial form
of a living body, free from the confining and restricting consequences ofmatter.""*^
Aquinas specifies several other properties of the human soul in the Summa
Theologiae, such as its simplicity and its uniqueness. However, the inmiateriality and
natural immortality of the human soul have been chosen for examination because of the
significant implications they have for three key issues in the contemporary mind-body
debate: human consciousness, human fi-eedom, and human destiny. These implications
will be investigated ftarther at the close of this chapter. Attention will now be given to
Aquinas's understanding of the powers of the human soul.
Aquinas bases this argument on the text from Genesis 2:7, "Then the LORD God formed man of dust
from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being."
ST I, 75, 6.
Mclnemy, 129.
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The Powers of the Human Soul
Aquinas identifies, following Aristotle's system, five specific powers of the soul -
the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the intellectual.'^'^ Due to
the focus of this thesis, special consideration will be given to two of the cardinal powers
of the human soul - the intellectual and the appetitive powers. The reason for this
limitation is Aquinas's assertion that "the other powers of the soul do not come directly
under the considerafion of the theologian.""*^
Aquinas classifies a human's intellectual power, or the human intellect, as one of
the primary powers of the human soul. This is because the human soul is able to acquire
knowledge about other bodies through the intellect. The way in which the intellect
acquires knowledge persuades Aquinas to the make a distinction between the passive and
active intellect. The active intellect, Aquinas writes, "is something in the soul.""*^ As
such, the active intellect is active in so far as it forms its concepts based on sensible
things. Aquinas comments that if something is moved from potentiality to act, it must be
moved to actuality by something already in actuality. Therefore, one must "assign on the
part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the
species fi-om material conditions.""*' The passive intellect is given its name for two
reasons. First, because, in contrast to the active intellect, the passive intellect is
dependent upon sensible things for its knowledge. Since the human soul does not possess
a reservoir of innate ideas upon which to draw, Copleston remarks that "it depends for the
ST I, 78, 1.
ST I, 84.
ST I, 79, 4.
ST I, 79, 3.
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acquisition of ioiowledge on sense-experience.""*^ Second, the passive intellect, as a
tabula rasa, is passive because, as Selman observes, "it is a potential for something, for
having intelligible likeness.""*^ The intellect, identified and understood in this manner,
causes Adler to conclude that the human soul's intellectual power is "the underlying
cause" of humanity's ability to know universals and particulars. Therefore, Gilson
concludes, "[t]he act proper to an intelligent soul is evidently intellectual knowledge."^'
The reason Aquinas asserts that the appetitive power, or the will, is important to
the theologian is because it is the will that moves the intellect. Aquinas identifies this
movement of the intellect by the will as an efficient cause. He writes, "wherever we have
order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end
moves the powers which regard particular ends." In this manner, "the will moves the
intellect as to the exercise of its act."^'* Aquinas explains this by commenting that the
object of the intellect is truth, while the object of the will is goodness. However, it must
be understood that the will does not exist or operate independent of the intellect.
O'Donnell comments that Aquinas's poshion maintains that the will "obtains from the
48
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intellect the information it needs in order to make right decisions."^^ For this reason,
Aquinas judges the will as the intellectual appetite. Kreeft describes Aquinas's concept
of the will as the "power of the soul to desire or choose a good known by the intellect.""
Aquinas considered the intellect and the will as the two primary powers of the
human soul. Based on this identification by Aquinas, Davies observes that "the human
soul ... is the locus of thought and will."^^ However, it must be understood that the
intellect and the will do not exist or act independently. Rather, with Aquinas's composite
dualism, the intellect and the will work together, and are the cause of the soul's
knowledge and desire of things outside itself in two ways. First, the intellect perceives
the forms ofmaterial things, thereby obtaining knowledge of them. Second, the will
moves to desire those things that the soul understands as its proper end. In this manner,
the rational soul is able to have both an intellectual knowledge and intellectual appetite.
The Implications ofAquinas's Composite Dualism
The previous section constructed and clarified Aquinas's understanding of the
human soul, identified and analyzed the human soul's immateriality and immortality as
two of its key properties, and examined the human intellect and will as two of its most
significant powers. Among the most important facets ofAquinas's understanding of the
human soul are the implications his position has for one's belief conceming the nature of
" Robert A. O'Donnell, Hooked on Philosophv: Thomas Aquinas Made Easy. (New York: Alba House,
1995), 61.
" Kreeft, 30.
Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 216.
Kreeft, 266.
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human consciousness, human freedom, and human destiny. Each of the imphcations
regarding human consciousness, human freedom, and human destiny, which resuh from
Aquinas's composite duahsm, will now be considered.
The first implication that results from Aquinas's composite dualism concerns
human consciousness. For Thomistic dualism, human consciousness has two key factors
that are relevant for this thesis. The first factor, human rationality, is an intrinsic element
ofAquinas's definition of a human soul. Because a human being possesses a rational
soul, as opposed to a purely vegetative or sensitive soul, it is the nature of a person to be
a rational being. One way to demonstrate this is to consider a human person's ability to
think conceptually. Though the world contains many creatures that have sensitive souls,
(able to perform operations based on information provided through the corporeal senses),
and which are able to think perceptually, only humanity has the ability to think
conceptually.^^ It is a necessary outcome of Aquinas's position that humanity's rational
soul gives a person the ability to think conceptually, rather than just perceptually. A
basis for this will be provided and defended in Chapter 3.
The second factor of human consciousness to be considered is fascinating, and
has major implications for the focus of this thesis. Aquinas maintains that the capacity
for self-transcendence is a natural resuh of the human soul's conscious character and
identity as a rational soul. As stated above, Aquinas's position maintains that only a
rational soul is able to think both perceptually and conceptually. Since a human being is
able to think both perceptually and conceptually, it follows that a person is able to
comprehend universals and not only particulars. With this ability for conceptual and
ST I, 78, 1.
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rational thought, Aquinas asserts, comes the capability for self-transcendence. Adler
echoes this belief and writes that "human thinking transcends the immediate enviroimient
and extends not only to objects in the remote past and the remote future but also to
objects that have no temporal locus whatsoever."^' Therefore, according to Thomistic
dualism, the human soul is necessarily self-transcendent. Barron writes that, "the human
is touched by a divine energy which lures him to self-transcendence."
The second implication that results from Thomistic dualism concerns the nature
of human freedom. There are two elements ofhuman freedom that deserve attention. To
begin, it is important to communicate that, for Aquinas, general volitional acts and moral
volitional acts are not the same. Creatures with both rational and sensitive souls may
make general volitional acts. This concept is closely connected with how one defines
freedom. If fi-eedom is defined as the ability for a creature to act without compulsion
from an outside source, then a creature with a sensitive soul that acts in a certain manner,
and is not compelled from an outside force to act in this manner, has freedom in
accordance with that and similar acts. For instance, suppose a cat named Boris wakes
from a nap on a couch and experiences the sensation of hunger. It jumps off the couch
and walks into the kitchen where it sees a substance it is used to consuming, which
happens to relieve the hunger sensations it experiences. Such an action would be
understood as a free act, since Boris did not act under compulsion from any outside
source. This would also be the case for creatures with rational souls (humans) in regards
to actions that have no moral connection. However, in regards to human freedom,
^' Adler, The Difference ofMan and the Difference it Makes. 136.
" Robert Barron, Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master. (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 142.
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Aquinas asserts that the rational soul's intellectual and appetitive powers provide
humanity the ability to make volitional moral choices. Davies observes that, for Aquinas,
"the mention of human action brings us to the realm ofmorality. "^^ Though, as stated
above, not every free human act is necessarily a moral act, every act that is based on
rationality and volition is a moral act. This is evident for two reasons. First, the human
person has the ability, using the intellect and the will, to act towards an end which is
considered desirable by the intellect and the will. Second, such an action is based on a
volitional choice, since "every individual action must needs have some circumstance that
makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end."^"* Aquinas further
comments that
if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it
is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it is
directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of
good.^^
Consequently, "the moral content of every human act resides in the intention of the
agent."^^ For instance, the owner of Boris, through his intellectual ability, realizes that it
is time for the cat to be hungry, and that feeding it would be a morally good thing to do.
Through an act of his will he fills Boris' feeding dish and places it in the spot that Boris
is familiar with in regards to finding food to eat. The end that both the intellect and the
will were directed to was a good end. Under this understanding, this action - feeding
Boris - would be considered a morally good act, since it was an action that was fulfilled
" Davies, 221.
^STI-II, 18, 9.
" Ibid.
^ O'Donnell, 73.
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by actions of both the intellect and of the will, directed towards a proper good end.
The second element of human freedom is a direct result of humanity's moral
freedom. This element is humanity's moral responsibility. As outlined above, himian
freedom, according to Aquinas, means that a human being is both a rational and free
creature, since freedom of choice is an act of the will that results from a judgment of the
reason. Turning from this to human responsibility, Aquinas states that if the human
person were not free "counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and
punishments would be in vain."^' Since a human being is a creature endowed with a
rational soul and capable ofmoral choices, this naturally leads Aquinas to hold that a
person is responsible for his moral actions. Adler writes, "the burden ofmoral
responsibility ... is inseparable from freedom of choice.
"^^
The final implication resulting from Thomistic dualism concerns human destiny.
For the purposes of this thesis, three elements of human destiny that follow from
Aquinas's composite dualism will be examined. To begin, Aquinas's position naturally
leads to the concept of the immortality of the human soul. There are three reasons why
Aquinas's understanding of the human soul leads to this conviction. First, since the
human soul is an immaterial substance, the presence of a body is not necessary in order
for the soul to continue to exist. Second, since the soul is naturally transcendent, it is not
necessary for the soul to be located in or defined by a physical body. Third, the human
soul is immortal, and survives the death of the body, because the human soul is an
" ST I, 83, 1.
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intellectual substance.^^ Thomistic dualism justifies this assumption based on the nature
of human conceptual thought. Mclnemy writes, "[t]he nature of thinking lifts the human
soul, although it is the substantial form of a living body, fi-ee from the confining and
restricting consequences ofmatter."'^ Hence, the soul does not exist and is active
because of a body. Rather, a body is able to survive and be active because of the
presence of a soul.
However, Aquinas does not conclude his discussion conceming human destiny at
this point. The second element of human destiny that follows from Thomistic dualism
concems the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and builds upon the
previous argument concerning the immortality of the human soul. For Aquinas, the
immortality of the human soul necessitates a future resurrection of the body. This is so
for two reasons. First, revelation upholds the assertion of a fiiture resurrection of the
body. Aquinas believed that it was contrary to the Christian faith to accept a spiritual
resurrection and deny a bodily one. Second, reason supports the doctrine of a future
resurrection of the body. He writes,
It is also clear . . . that the soul is naturally united to the body, for in its essence
it is the form of the body. It is, then, contrary to the nature of the soul to be
without the body. But nothing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual.
Perpetually, then, the soul will not be without the body. Since then, it persists
perpetually, it must once again be united to the body, and this is to rise again.
Therefore, the immortality of the soul seems to demand a future resurrection of
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For Aquinas, "man cannot achieve his uhimate happiness unless the soul be once again
united to the body."'^ "For Aquinas paradise is no disembodied, purely intellectual state
of affairs; on the contrary, it is richly imagined as the blissftil fulfillment of the totality of
human being," Barron concludes.'"* Clearly, according to Thomistic dualism, human
destiny is based on the immortality of the soul that culminates in the fiiture resurrection
of the body.
The final implication to be considered by this thesis conceming human destiny
concems humanity's special creation. Indeed, in many ways this implication is a basis
for the other two. For Aquinas, humanity's special creation signified that each human
individual was made in the image of God. Thomistic dualism provides three signs that
give evidence in support of this idea. The first sign is human morality. This can be
established by understanding the relationship ofmorality to both God and human beings.
For Aquinas, both God and each human individual have an intellect and a will.
Aquinas defines moral actions as those actions that move "voluntarily in the light of
recognized ends or goals" informed by a rational intellect.'^ This leads Aquinas to regard
both God and the human person as moral agents. In this manner, human morality is a
sign ofman being made in the image ofGod. The second sign is human immortality.
Adler states that "[o]nly man requires God's special creative action. No other living
thing on earth is vouchsafed individual immortality by God."" One reason for this is the
" CG 4, 79, 1 1 .
Barron, 148-149.
ST I, 19, 1.
�'^ Davies, 220.
Adler, The Difference ofMan and the Difference it Makes. 286-287.
36
necessary intervention by God for the creation of each human person. The biological
processes of reproduction cannot account for the coming into existence of each rational
human soul. Hence, the genesis of each human person "requires the intervention of
divine causality."'^ The third sign is human rationality. Aquinas, quoting Augustine,
writes that things which know and understand "approach so near to God in likeness, that
among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him."'' Therefore, "intellectual creatures
alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image. "^"^ Adler echoes this judgement
when he states that "the human intellect is the only basis for understanding man as made
in the image or likeness ofGod."^'
This chapter has attempted to establish the boundaries of this thesis by analyzing
Aquinas's composite dualism and exploring its implications for human consciousness,
human freedom, and human destiny. The chapter began by defining the soul in general,
and identifying the human soul in particular as a rational soul. This was followed by the
identification of the immateriality and immortality of the soul as two of its key properties
relevant to this thesis. Next, the intellect and the will were identified as the human soul's
two principle powers which are particularly relevant to the current issues in the mind-
body debate being studied in this thesis. Finally, the issues of human consciousness,
human freedom, and human destiny that result from Thomistic dualism were identified
and examined.
Adler, The Difference ofMan and the Difference it Makes. 286.
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This chapter has demonstrated that Aquinas's composite duahsm is both elaborate
and thorough. Based on this chapter, three judgments may be offered. First, Aquinas's
understanding of the human soul as the form of the body and the living principle of life is
philosophically defensible. Utilizing human experience, scientific knowledge, logic, and
Scriptural insight, Aquinas demonstrates his expertise with both philosophy and theology.
Further, Aquinas's position has not been demonstrated as erroneous despite modem
attacks against his notion of the human soul from both metaphysical materialists and
substance dualists. Second, Aquinas's conclusions conceming the human soul,
particularly his understanding conceming human freedom and destiny, are in accordance
with the Christian faith. It is tme that Aquinas is a Natural Theologian, but he is equally
a Biblical Theologian. His philosophical and theological positions conceming the nature
of the human person are fully informed by historic orthodox Christian faith. Third,
Aquinas's composite dualism is beneficial in demonstrating the importance of a proper
understanding of the human soul. As Barron observes, "Aquinas's writings on the human
person are extremely 'soulful,' reminding us of our dignity and destiny as children of the
divine."*^ For these reasons, Aquinas must be considered as an essential resource for the
study of human consciousness, human freedom, and human destiny, and of how these
issues relate to the current debate regarding the mind-body problem. It is these three
issues that will be examined in more detail in the following chapters.
Barron, 159.
38
CHAPTER 3
THOMISTIC DUALISM AND HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
With Aquinas's composite duahsm outhned and explained in Chapter 1, this
chapter will explore the relevance of Thomistic dualism to the modem mind-body debate
in relation to the issue of human consciousness. It should be noted that the study of
human consciousness has, until recently, been largely ignored by most disciplines except
philosophy, which has kept the fires of the debate regarding the nature and basis of
human consciousness buming. However, now both philosophers and physical scientists
have begun to take the issue of human consciousness seriously. This has been a radical
reversal to the normal attitudes encountered among critics of non-materialisfic
conceptions of human consciousness.'
The specific issue, which this chapter will attempt to resolve, is whether
metaphysical materialism can account for the phenomena of human consciousness. This
chapter will begin by defining the term human consciousness, and identify the principal
factors of human consciousness that relate to this thesis. This will be followed by an
examination of the soft materialist conception of human consciousness of John Searle,
the quantum-physicalist position ofRoger Penrose, and the hard materialistic position of
Francis Crick. These materialistic understandings of the nature of human consciousness
' Francis Crick quotes a statement from John Searle. "As recently as a few years ago, if one raised the
subject of consciousness in cognitive science discussions, it was generally regarded as a form of bad taste,
and graduate students . . . would roll their eyes at the ceiling and assume expressions ofmild disgust."
Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1994), vii.
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will then be critiqued in light ofAquinas's composite position, showing that they have an
inadequate basis for understanding the nature of human consciousness.
What is Human Consciousness?
Human consciousness has continually been a source of vigorous debate in relation
to the mind-body issue. Indeed, The Oxford Dictionary ofPhilosophv proclaims human
consciousness as perhaps "the most challenging and pervasive source of problems in the
whole of philosophy."^ An important reason why human consciousness is a problem is
because the answer of how to define human consciousness is not settled. One general
definition would state that human consciousness is any type ofhuman mental state.
However, G. F. Stout provides a more helpful definition of human consciousness when
he writes that it is "not only the awareness of our own states, but these states themselves,
whether we have cognisance of them or not."^ Any valuable definition of human
consciousness must contain three principal factors conceming human consciousness. The
first principal factor of human consciousness is thought or thinking. The act or ability to
think is necessary in order to achieve any level of awareness. This may be illustrated by
calling attention to the fact that, though the type of conscious activity in various forms of
living organisms is debated, no one can plausibly claim that inanimate objects, such as
Michelangelo's David, are conscious."* However, the human capacity for thought, as it
^ Simon Blackburn, editor, The Oxford Dictionary ofPhilosophv, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), 77.
^ Paul Edwards, editor in chief, The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophv. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 193.
�* Of course, this is not to say that no one has made this claim. For instance, Searle notes that John
McCarthy, champion of the belief in artificial intelligence, once remarked that machines "as simple as
thermostats can be said to have beliefs." John Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1984), 30.
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relates to human consciousness, must be understood as more than the act or ability of
sensation. This is because the ability to think moves beyond the ability to sense "either
as an elaboration of the materials of sense or as an apprehension of objects which are
totally beyond the reach of the senses."^ This issue will be discussed later in this chapter.
A second principal factor of human consciousness is the act or ability of an
individual to observe his own thoughts and ideas. In other words, a person has the ability
to think about his thinking. John Locke considered this to be a vital factor for
understanding human consciousness when he defined consciousness as "the perception of
what passes in a man's own mind."^ This factor focuses on the introspective nature of
human consciousness - the act or ability of observing one's own mental state. This factor
of human consciousness is almost a universal aspect of understanding human thought.
Bertrand Russell wrote that the "faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself
is the main characteristic of a mind."'
The third principal factor of human consciousness is self-knowledge, and must be
differentiated from the type of knowledge mentioned in the previous paragraph. Human
self-knowledge is a vital factor in regards to properly understanding the phenomena of
human consciousness and should be differentiated from an individual's knowledge of
one's own thoughts and ideas. It is apparent that higher forms of living organisms have a
certain level of knowledge. For instance, in order for Boris, the domestic cat introduced
in Chapter 1 , to be able to eat, he requires the ability to attain a certain amount of
^ Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Ideas: A Lexicon ofWestern Thought. (New York: Macmillan, 1992),
543.
* John Locke, An Essay Conceming Human Understanding. II, 1,19.
' Quoted by Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Ideas. 543.
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knowledge. This would include his awareness of certain sensations and objects, such as
the hunger sensations being caused by his body, and the apprehension of such objects as
the kitchen floor, his food bowl, and the food in the bowl. However, human
consciousness has the ability to be aware of not only one's surroundings, but of one's self
as well. The level of abstractive thought, which is necessary to have the self-knowledge
which human consciousness displays, points to the third principal factor of human
consciousness. This illustrates that there is a dual character to human thinking - a
person's ability to think perceptually and conceptually - and follows from Aquinas's
distinction between the sensitive soul and the rational soul. This will be further examined
at the end of this chapter. Hence, human thought has the ability to be aware of one's self,
as well as the objects ofwhich one is thinking.
Though the exact properties of human consciousness continue to remain an open
Q
question in philosophy, it has been demonstrated that these three factors are vital and
necessary components of human consciousness. These three principal factors establish a
more complete understanding of human consciousness and make a more accurate
definition of human consciousness possible. "It is by means of consciousness that a
person acquires the ideas of the various operations ofmental states, such as the ideas of
perceiving, thinking, doubting, reasoning, knowing, and willing and learns of his own
mental states at a given time."'
With human consciousness properly defined and the factors related to it provided
above, attention will now be given to three conceptions of human consciousness found in
* Robert Audi, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Piiilosophv. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 606.
' Paul Edwards, editor in chief. The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophv. 191.
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the current mind-body debate. Each of these will first be outlined and evaluated. The
evaluation will focus on two areas, the philosophical justification for their arguments, and
a critique in view ofAquinas's composite dualism. First, the metaphysical materialistic
position of John Searle will be examined. This will be followed by the quantum-
physicalist position ofRoger Penrose.
The Soft Materialistic Basis for Human Consciousness: John Searle
Prior to examining Searle's conception of human consciousness, it is necessary to
answer two questions. First, how does Searle define the phenomena of human
consciousness? Second, under what framework does Searle seek to understand human
consciousness? After Searle's position has been outlined, his argument in favor of a
materialistic basis for human consciousness will be examined and critiqued.
To begin, it is important to note that Searle has a narrow definition of human
consciousness. He understands consciousness as the ability to be aware of one's
surroundings.*^ In this regard Searle is in agreement with John Locke's definition of
human consciousness, as the perception of that ofwhich a mind has knowledge. Yet,
Searle also considers three other factors to be necessary for human consciousness. These
other factors serve to augment his definifion of human consciousness. The first factor he
refers to as intentionality, or "the feature by which our mental states are directed at, or
about, or refer to, or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other than
themselves."" The second related factor involves the subjective nature ofmental states.
'� Searle, 15.
" Ibid., 16.
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This is an important factor of human consciousness because it is the nature of a person's
mental states to be subjective and unable to be experienced by others.'^ The third related
factor to human consciousness is the phenomena ofmental causation, which considers
the fact "that thoughts and feelings make a real difference to the way we behave, that
they actually have some casual effect on the physical world." For instance, if a person
decides to get up out of bed in the morning, this desire causes their body to move in a
specific manner that results in them getting out of bed. Alongside these three factors, the
mystery of human consciousness is one of the reasons why the mind-body problem seems
so difficuh.'"*
However, Searle is convinced that the solution to the mind-body problem is, in
fact, a simple one.*^ According to Searle, the key to understanding human consciousness,
like other aspects of the mind-body problem, is to understand it under a completely
materialistic framework. Searle maintains that all mental states are, in fact, biological
phenomena. "Consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation are all a
part of our biological life history, along with growth, reproduction, the secretion of bile,
and digestion."'^ Therefore, Searle's materialistic position may be described as a
combination ofmentalism (the belief that mental phenomena really exist), and
physicalism (the belief that all that exists in the world are physical particles with their
Searle, 16.
'Mbid., 17.
Ibid.
As Searle writes, "[t]he way, in short, to dispel the mystery is to understand the process," Minds.
Brains and Science. 23. However, as will be argued in this chapter, the physical process cannot account for
all aspects of the mystery.
Ibid., 41.
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properties and relations)."
Searle's argument in favor of a materialistic conception of human consciousness
has two major elements. The first element contains two premises which he proposes.
The first premise is that all mental phenomena "whether conscious or unconscious, visual
or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, thoughts, indeed, all of our mental life, are caused by
processes going on in the brain."'^ Searle goes to great length to establish this part of his
argument. For Searle all sensations "are caused by a series of events that begin at free
nerve endings and end in the thalamus and in other regions of the brain."*' This first
premise in his argument is important for Searle since it provides the basis for the
remainder of his argument. Hence, "everything that matters for our mental life, all of our
thoughts and feelings, are caused by processes inside the brain."^'' The second premise,
that all mental phenomena are features of the brain, necessarily follows from the first.^'
However, Searle's conclusion, that human consciousness is entirely caused by physical
processes occurring in the brain, does not follow from these premises. Though they are
necessary conditions for his position, they are not sufficient conditions. Searle is aware
of this, and notes that this conclusion about the nature of human consciousness is often
puzzling because the conclusion appears to imply that the brain causes itself Such an
assertion appears to be a fallacious argument. Searle illustrates this as follows.
It is tempting to think that whenever A causes B there must be two discrete
events, one identified as the cause, the other identified as the effect; that all
" Searle, 26-27.
'Mbid., 18.
" Ibid., 18-19.
Ibid., 19.
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causation functions in the same way as bilhard balls hitting each other. This
crude model of the causal relationships between brain and the mind inclines us to
accept some kind of dualism; we are inclined to think that events in one material
realm, the 'physical', cause events in another insubstantial realm, the ' mental. '^^
Therefore, in order further to establish his position, Searle provides the second element of
his argument. Searle introduces a qualifying statement into his argument which he
believes, together with the two premises, comprises sufficient conditions for his position.
Searle states that the self-referential problem (that brains cause minds, and minds are only
features of brains) may be avoided by correcting common misunderstanding of causation.
To demonstrate this Searle uses an illustration that distinguishes between micro and
macro properties common in physics. Consider a glass ofwater on a table. Each object
is composed ofmicro-properties that manifest themselves as macro-properties when
observed at the macro level, which are in turn observed as features.
For example, the solidity of the table in front ofme is explained by the lattice
structure occupied by the molecules of which the table is composed. Similarly,
the liquidity of the water is explained by the nature of the interactions between the
H2O molecules. Those macro-features are causally explained by the behaviour of
elements at the micro-level.
Hence, the seemingly mysterious relationship between the mind and brain (or mental
events and brain events) may be explained in a similar way. Searle argues that human
consciousness may be logically understood as a surface feature that is accounted for by
the behavior of the micro-elements that make up the brain, and "at the same time is
realised in the system that is made up of the micro-elements."^'*
Searle, 20.
" Ibid., 21.
Ibid.
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The other three features that are related to human consciousness, intentionality,
subjectivity, and mental causation, have as their foundation this notion of causation, or
cause-effect relationship. Intentionality, such as thirst (or the desire to drink) is to be
understood as caused by physical events in the central nervous system and realized in the
hypothalamus. "Thirst is therefore an intentional state: it has content; its content
determines under what conditions it is satisfied, and it has all the rest of the features that
are conmion to intentional states." The second related factor was subjectivity. Because
the human central nervous system is a closed system "the existence of subjectivity is an
objective fact of biology." The third related factor was mental causation. Mental
causation refers to the question of how mental events can cause bodily movements.
Searle maintains that "brain activity causes bodily movements by physiological
processes."^'
Despite the apparent simplicity of Searle's argument, it is unclear which type of
causation to which Searle's argimient is referring. According to inductive reasoning,
there are four main types of causation that seek to determine the causes of things or
events. In order for Searle's argument (that human consciousness is caused by and
realized in physical processes in the brain) to be valid, it must conform to one of these
types and survive a critique.
One type of causation identifies the causes of things or events in terms of distant
causes in the causal chain from the phenomena being considered. This type of causation
Searle, 24.
Ibid., 25.
" Ibid., 26.
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is referred to as the proximate cause. For instance, suppose there is a car that breaks
down on Interstate 10 outside Phoenix, Arizona. The owner checks under the hood and
notices that there is no oil in the engine. Upon inspection by a mechanic, it is discovered
that there is a manufacturing defect in the oil pan that caused all of the oil to leak out of
the car. The defect in the oil pan would be the proximate or remote cause of the car
breaking down. However, this is not the type of causation on which Searle's argument is
based. This is because Searle states that the physical events occurring in the brain are not
distant causes necessary for human consciousness. Rather, his argument implies a more
direct correlation between the physical events in the brain and the phenomena of human
consciousness.
A second type of causation, the probable cause, refers to things or events where it
is not necessarily true "that producing the cause always produces the effect."^* Suppose
that the manufacturing defect in the oil pan only produces a leak in extremely warm
weather. Accordingly, the owner of a similar make and model of car living in Minnesota
would not necessarily experience the same breakdown as the owner living in Arizona.
The type of causation also does not seem to apply to Searle's argument either.
A third type of causation may be described as a necessary condition for bringing
about a particular thing or event. Something is a necessary condition if it is required for
the actualization of a thing or event. This type of causation does apply to Searle's
argument, since he writes that "everything that matters for our mental life, all of our
29
thoughts and feelings, are caused by processes inside the brain."
Kahane and Tidman, Logic and Philosophv: A Modem Introduction 7* ed., (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1995), 338.
Searle, 19.
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The fourth main type of causation is usually described in terms of one thing or
event being the sufficient condition for another thing or event. For instance, the cause of
Julius Caesar's death was being stabbed repeatedly by knives. His being stabbed
repeatedly (damaging vital organs and being denied proper medical treatment) would
then be properly understood as a sufficient cause of his death. In other words, something
is a sufficient condition if there are no other things or events necessary in order to
actualize a certain thing or event. For this reason, Searle's argument also could conform
to this fourth type of causation. However, of the two types of causation on which Searle
could be basing his argument, it seems clear that the fourth type of causation is the one on
which Searle's argument depends. This is because Searle is convinced that the central
nervous system and the physical events in the brain are all that is necessary for the
achievement of the phenomena of human consciousness. Whether or not this is an
adequate accounting for the basis of human consciousness will be discussed at the end of
the chapter.
It has been demonstrated that Searle believes that the brain, and the physical
events that occur in the brain, are necessary and sufficient conditions for human
consciousness. In light of this, because of his belief in the reality ofmental phenomena,
Searle's position on human consciousness should be further defined as a type of soft
materialism. Clearly, Searle caimot be described as a dualist because, though he believes
that the mind and body interact in order to generate consciousness in human beings, he
believes that "all mental phenomena are just features of the brain."^�
Searle, 26.
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The Quantum-Phvsicalist Basis for Human Consciousness: Roger Penrose
The mathematician Roger Penrose has recently published his proposed solution to
the modem mind-body debate, and shares many of the same elements as John Searle's.
These will be outlined briefly. However, Penrose's position is also quite unique. This
section will briefly outline the way in which he believes human consciousness should be
understood. This will be accomplished by, first, providing his definition of human
consciousness, and second, outlining and examining his theory for the basis of human
consciousness. This will be followed by a critique. Since, as stated above, there are
many similarities between Searle's soft-materialism and Penrose's quantum-physicalism,
this section will briefly focus on those areas in which Penrose's position is unique with
regards to understanding the nature and basis for human consciousness.
Penrose is candid in his admission that he is unwilling to define human
consciousness. The reason for this is because, he writes, "we do not know what it is."^'
However, Penrose does attempt to identify and explain the various components of human
consciousness. In this manner, though Penrose is hesitant about deflning human
consciousness, he does believe that it is possible to understand the mystery referred to as
human consciousness through an entirely scientific explanation. Nonetheless, Penrose
maintains that the key to this explanation is not with neurobiology, physiology or
traditional physics. Rather, he looks to quantum theory, and its application at the
molecular and quantum levels in the human brain, as the way in which human
^'
Roger Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 99. Penrose, however, goes on to bring two terms into the discussion he believes are necessary for a
proper definition of human consciousness - awareness and intelligence.
Ibid., 97.
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consciousness is to be understood. Penrose believes that if human consciousness could
be understood by classical physics it would be able to be duplicated in a mathematical or
computational scale. If true, it would be possible to construct a conscious computer -
one that would pass the Church-Turing test. However, Penrose does not believe that this
IS possible. This is because the "physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this
physical action caimot be properly simulated computationally."^^ Therefore, Penrose
seeks to understand the nature and foundation of human consciousness on the basis of the
recent lessons and theorems from quantum physics. Stated briefly, Penrose believes that
Non-local effects . . . occur in quantum mechanics and they cannot be understood
in terms of one thing being separate from another - some sort of global activity is
taking place. It seems to me that consciousness is something global. Therefore,
any physical process responsible for consciousness would have to be something
with an essentially global character. Quantum coherence certainly fits the bill in
this respect.^"*
Penrose's theory is very complex, and it is not the objective of this chapter to
completely outline his theory. However, the point being made is that Penrose's theory,
like Searle's, is based on metaphysical materialism. From this two points against his
argument emerge. First, though he pushes the explanation of human consciousness to the
quantum level, Penrose is quite satisfied with his physicalist position. Clearly, then,
Penrose's position, though unique, is another example of an argument for the nature and
foundation of human consciousness based on metaphysical materialism. Second, Penrose
is not specifically clear about how his theory could account for human consciousness.
His argument appears to be that because both quantum mechanics and human
"
Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12.
^* Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. 133.
Ibid., 98.
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consciousness are mysterious they must be causally related in some manner. However,
because Penrose does not offer a detailed outline of his proposal, his theory cannot be
challenged, defended or defeated. Therefore, Penrose's argument ultimately suffers from
a problem of indefiniteness, in that it cannot be challenged and is not falsifiable.
The Hard Materialistic Basis for Human Consciousness: Francis Crick
Soft materialists are not the only ones who have championed this metaphysical
materialistic understanding of human consciousness. One of the more systematic
accounts is found in the recent research and writings of Francis Crick. This section has
three main objectives. The first one is to provide Crick's definition of human
consciousness. The second objective will be to identify the major differences between
Crick's hard materialistic basis for human consciousness, and the soft materialism of
Searle and Penrose, which are relevant to this thesis. The third objective will be to
identify the major similarities between these positions that are relevant to this thesis.
Crick defines consciousness as "a vivid internal picture of the external world."^'
This definition corresponds well with Searle's definition provided earlier in this chapter.
Such a picture would necessarily involve an awareness of one's surroundings, and would
also include, according to Crick, an awareness of the self For this reason Crick believes
that the best way to approach the "problem" of human consciousness is through the
38
scientific study of human visual awareness.
Stephen Hawking provides a similar critique about Penrose's theory of human consciousness in his
small article in The Large. The Small and the Human Mind. 171.
" Crick, 9.
Ibid., 203.
52
Despite the close association with Searle's definition of human consciousness,
there are several elements in Crick's understanding for the basis ofhuman consciousness
which challenge Searle's approach. Two of them are pertinent to this thesis. First, in
contrast to Searle's use of philosophy. Crick assumes that using only "scientific" and
naturalistic methods is the best way to approach the quest conceming the nature of human
consciousness.^' He writes that the mind "requires a scientific explanation," and that
"what is needed are suggestions for new experiments in order to validate this
assumption. ""'^ This opinion is echoed by many within the scientific community
investigating the nature and basis for human consciousness."" Phillip Johnson observes
that despite Crick's insistence "that scientists hold their hypotheses only as provisional
beliefs and not by 'blind faith,' it is not clear what, if anj^hing, could convince him that
there is more to the mind than matter. Materialism to Crick is equivalent to science, and
science to rationality.""*^ In this way, Crick is locked completely within a fi-amework of
metaphysical materialism. It is from this fi-amework that the second point of
disagreement is established. Whereas Searle maintained that mental phenomena actually
exist. Crick asserts that this is not the case. Rather, Crick believes that a full and detailed
account of the nature of human consciousness may be based on and obtained exclusively
" It is ironic that Crick's position is the opposite of those who began the scientific revolution, such as
Galileo and Descartes, both ofwhom "made a sharp distinction between the physical reality described by
science and the mental reality of the soul, which they considered to be outside the scope of scientific
research." John R. Searle, "The Mystery ofConsciousness," The New York Review. 2 Nov. 1995, 60.
*� Crick, 19.
ChristofKoch, one of Crick's former students, once stated that "philosophy has a much slimmer
chance of providing lasting insights about the mind-body problem" and that curious philosophers "should
heed the advice of their illustrious forebear Ludwig Wittgenstein: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one
must be silent.'" Jack Horgan, "Can Science Explain Consciousness?," Scientific American, July, 1994, 94.
Phillip Johnson, Reason in the Balance: A Case against Naturalism in Science, Law and Education,
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 65.
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through a materiahstic explanation. In his recent book, The Astonishing Hypothesis,
Francis Crick writes, "your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions,
your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a
vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules."'*'' Hence, the mind is to be
understood as "a consequence of the action of the components of the brain."'*'* It is
important to remember that Searle maintained that human consciousness is the
cumulative result of certain surface features of the brain. Though Crick would agree with
Searle's materialistic understanding. Crick's position on human consciousness is also
reductionistic.'*^ Crick maintains that the "true description of us is the complex, ever-
changing pattem of interactions of billions of [neurons], connected together in ways that,
in their details, are unique to each one of us.""*^ The late Carl Sagan echoes this hard
materialistic and reductionistic position conceming the nature of human consciousness in
his Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Dragons ofEden. "My fundamental premise about
the brain is that its workings - what we sometimes call 'mind' - are a consequence of its
anatomy and physiology, and nothing more.""*'
However, Searle and Crick's poshions share some important similarities. First, as
stated above, both Crick and Searle believe that human consciousness may be described
by causally explaining the physical events that occur in the brain. For instance, Crick
Crick, 3.
Ibid.
Ibid., 7. Cf. John Searle, "The Mystery ofConsciousness," The New York Review. 2 Nov., 1995, 62.
Ibid., 260.
Carl Sagan, The Dragon's of Eden: Speculations on the Evolution ofHuman Intelligence. (New York:
Random House, 1977), 7.
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agrees with Searle that the event of human awareness may be understood by "the activity
of the various cortical areas as well as the thalamus.""*^ Second, each of the above
positions - Crick's hard materialism, Searle's soft materialism, even Penrose's quantum-
physicalist position - consider the physical properties and events of the human brain and
central nervous system as both necessary and sufficient conditions for human
consciousness.
However, do these materialistic positions of Searle, Penrose, and Crick
adequately account for the nature and basis for human consciousness? The remainder of
this chapter will argue that the above materialistic conceptions of human consciousness in
fact do not, and that the composite dualism of proposed by Thomas Aquinas offers a
more persuasive explanation for human consciousness.
The Thomistic Composite Dualist Basis for Human Consciousness
As illustrated above, a large number of scientists and philosophers have begun to
defend various materialistic conceptions of the nature and basis of human consciousness.
Each of those examined by this chapter shares a similar characteristic: that the human
brain and the events occurring in the brain are both necessary and sufficient causes for
human consciousness. In contrast, Aquinas's composite dualism maintains that this is not
an accurate understanding for the basis of human consciousness."*' The remainder of this
chapter will support this assertion ofThomistic dualism, defending several key elements
Crick, 249.
One reason why this is an insufficient understanding is because of the belief of some (e.g.. Crick) that
human consciousness is a purely scientific issue. Mortimer J. Adler maintains that the nature of the human
mind is both a scientific and philosophical question. Cf Mortimer J. Adler, The Conditions of Philosophv:
Its Checkered Past. Its Present Disorder, and Its Future Promise. (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 21-38.
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ofThomistic duahsm. The objective of this segment will be to demonstrate that the
implications for human consciousness that result from Aquinas's position conceming the
powers and properties of the human soul will illustrate that the brain and events occurring
in the brain cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for human consciousness.
Since the approaches outlined above cannot account for human consciousness, it will be
argued that Aquinas's understanding of the human soul accounts for human rationality,
which is a universally acknowledged characteristic of human consciousness.
Aquinas believed that one of the main implications for his conception of the
human soul concemed the nature of human rationality. Because a human being possesses
a rational soul, as opposed to a vegetative or sensitive soul, it is the nature of a human
being to be a rational creature. It is the rational type of soul which provides human
individuals their intellectual ability and character. The importance of this may be
illustrated by highlighting Aquinas's discussion conceming the powers and properties of
the human soul relevant to human consciousness.
Thomistic dualism maintains that there are two cardinal powers of the human soul
that are relevant to understanding the basis for human consciousness - the intellect and
the will. Though the power of the will is a vital aspect ofAquinas's anthropology, it is
the second power - the intellect - that is particularly relevant to this issue. For Aquinas,
the active intellect forms the concepts by which a person is able to acquire knowledge of
both material and non-material things.^' Hence, the human intellect is the necessary and
^� ST I, 76, 1.
ST I, 79, 3. "Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses
are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefr)re assign on the part of the intellect some
power to make things actually intelligible, by absfraction of the species from material conditions."
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sufficient cause for a person's ability to comprehend particulars and universals. For
Aquinas, it is a person's rational soul that gives that person the ability to think
conceptually, rather than just perceptually.
This distinction is implicit in the observation that animal thinking is confined to
the perceptual present, whereas human thinking transcends the immediate
environment and extends not only to objects in the remote past and the remote
fiiture but also to objects that have no temporal locus whatsoever.
This assertion contradicts the materialist's assumption that human consciousness may be
accounted for based solely on the physical characteristics of the brain and brain events.
This assertion is based on the following principle. It is not hard to understand how a
physical creature can perceive a physical object by physical causality through a brain and
central nervous system. However, under the mechanistic positions described above, it is
not clear how a human individual could perceive the idea of a universal object (which is
an object of thought, though not a physical object) based on the physical causality of the
human brain and central nervous system. This principle is an unavoidable result of the
position ofAquinas's composite dualism that the human intellect has a particular
property, a quality that cannot be accounted for through a purely materialistic
understanding of human consciousness. This leads back to the first property of the
human soul identified by Aquinas - immateriality. This principle based on Aquinas's
position may be demonstrated by establishing the premise conceming the unique and
conceptual character of human thought. In order to demonstrate the validity of this
premise it is necessary to further investigate the difference between animal thought and
human thought. For Aquinas, and unlike Descartes, since the lower animals have
" Mortimer J. Adler, The Difference ofMan and the Difference it Makes. (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1993), 136.
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sensitive souls, they are capable of a certain level of thought - perceptual thought.
Humanity, however, because of its rational soul, has the capacity for conceptual thought.
The character of conceptual thought has a certain property that demonstrates that only
humans have this particular intellectual capacity. Human conceptual thought has the
capacity to obtain knowledge of universals. In terms of epistemological knowledge, a
universal refers to a concept that identifies a type of object, but not necessarily the object
itself Consider, for instance, use of the term "cat." When a person uses this word he
may be referring to any cat, regardless of breed, size, color, or disposition. This use of
the word cat would indicate the ability to have knowledge of a universal. However,
when a person refers to a specific cat, utilizing a proper name, such as "Boris," he is
displaying the ability to think perceptually, because he has the ability to understand a
particular object in reality.^'* Likewise, Boris has the ability to visualize and have
knowledge of a particular - the specific object that feeds it. However, according to the
implications of Thomistic dualism, Boris is unable to understand the universal idea of
"owner" because the universal signified by the term "owner" does not exist in physical
reality. One attempt to clarify this makes the following illustration using a triangle as an
example. Any triangle that can be experienced in reality or visualized in the human mind
has a particular proportion and angular structure. However, humans have the ability to
understand what is meant by triangularity without referring to a particular triangle. This
"This demarcation of one thing to an other (or from all others) is what constitutes its concept.
Wolfliart Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea ofGod, frans. Philip Clayton, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1990), 24.
"To apprehend something as a particular instance of a certain kind involves an apprehension of the
kind itself" Mortimer J. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes. (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 48.
Mortimer J. Adler, Intellect: Mind Over Matter. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 50.
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act of comprehending a universal is a power of the intellect. As Aquinas states, "no
action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein."^^
Aquinas further maintains that "the power which is the principle of this action must be
something in the soul."^' Since Adler has demonstrated that "animal thinking is confined
to the perceptual present,"^^ the ability for humans to comprehend universals and to
intellectually transcend the here and now indicates that there must be an immaterial
property to human intellect. And this property cannot be accounted for through a purely
materialistic conception of human rationality and consciousness. Hence, Aquinas writes.
Our concepts are universal in their signification of objects that are kinds or classes
of things rather than individuals that are particular instances of these classes of
kinds. Since they have universality, they carmot exist physically or be embodied
in matter. But concepts do exist in our minds . . . Hence, that power must be an
immaterial power, not one embodied in a material organ such as the brain.
"However," a critic may object, "triangles have an existence in reality. Therefore,
how can it be argued that triangularity only exists in the human mind, and not in the mind
of the lower animals?" This counter argument can be resolved by observing that there
are universal concepts that can be understood in the human mind which have no physical
existence in reality, and which require conceptual thought. One example of this is the
concept of the infinite. The concept of the infinite can only exist in the mind because
there is no physical example of an infinite object to which one could be referred. Quentin
Lauer argues along similar lines, stating that it is impossible for the human senses to
ST 1, 79, 4.
" Ibid.
Adler, The Difference ofMan and the Difference it Makes. 136. Pages 112-226 (chapters 8-12)
contain Adler's complete argument for this assertion.
59 Adler, Intellect. 50.
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represent infinity to the mind. Consequently, the concept of the infinite "can be the
object of thought and thought alone - as Hegel put it, of pure rational thought."^�
The ability of the human intellect to think conceptually implies that human
consciousness has a transcendent character.^* The idea of conceptual thought being a
product of the nature of humanity's rational soul, and providing a person the ability to
think beyond mere perceptual experience is a natural outcome of Thomistic dualism.
There have even been some findings based on scientific research that supports this
notion. The famous experimental surgery by physician Wilder Penfield on the temporal
lobes of the brain is one example. Penfield discovered that electrical stimulation of the
brain would cause the patient not merely to recall but to relive certain encounters of a
patient's past in explicit detail, including sounds, sights, smells and sensations. The
amazing aspect of this is that the patient remained conscious during the entire operation,
able to distinguish the vivid memory (replayed like a movie in her mind) from the reality
of her being operated on in a hospital. The patient was able to transcend the experiential
and sensational perceptions of her brain. Roger Sperry's neurological research led him to
the conclusion that the self-transcendent nature of the human mind forces one to
acknowledge that the human mind cannot be accounted for merely through neuronal
activity in the brain.^^ This finding has led several neurophysiologists to the belief that
*� Quentin Lauer, Hegel's Concept ofGod. (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1984), 173.
^' Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that it is difficult to understand how a person can conceive of a border
without also thinking about what lies beyond that border. Hence, the idea "of the finite as such can
therefore not be thought without already thinking the Infinite at the same time." Metaphysics and the Idea
ofGod. 24-25.
" Cf William Poundstone, Labyrinths ofReason. (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 3-5.
Laurence W. Wood, "Recent Brain Research and the Mind-Body Dilemma," The Asburv Theological
Journal, 41, no. 1 (1986), 43.
60
"the brain is directed and controlled by an immaterial mind."^'* Hence, Sperry's "major
contention is that the human mind (the self) is fundamentally distinct from the neuronal
activity of the brain."^^ Hence, if humans are creatures whose minds can be totally
understood in a materialistic framework it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive how
a person has the ability to transcend his sensory experience.
These arguments maintain that the human mind's capacity for conceptual thought,
and the transcendent character of human thought, persuasively imply that there exists an
immaterial component to the human mind - one which cannot be accounted for through a
purely naturalistic and mechanistic framework. In the light of these arguments and this
evidence the assertion that human consciousness may be completely explained by the
brain and mental events occurring in the brain maintained by Searle, Penrose, and Crick
is difficult to accept. For instance, recall that Searle maintained that the central nervous
system and physical events in the brain were sufficient conditions for human
consciousness. However, the human capacity for conceptual thought implies that a non-
material component is necessary in order for conceptual thought to be accomplished.
This leads back a statement by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae. He writes that
if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form
by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that
the soul does not give being absolutely, and consequently that it is not the
substantial form; and so at the advent of the soul there would not be absolute but
only relative generation, nor at its removal complete corruption, all of which is
clearly false.
^
Wood, 57.
Ibid., 55.
ST I, 76, 4.
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For Aquinas, a substantial form is what animates a body. It is the rational soul that is the
substantial form which provides a person his intellectual and self-transcendent abilities.
Aquinas would argue that if another form, such as physical body alone, were the
substantial form ofhumanity, then all physical things would be living.^' "For it is clear
that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; if
that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life."^^ This
provides a rational basis for Aquinas's composite dualism, that the human body and the
human mind (or rational soul) together make one substance. Therefore, the intellectual
character of a person must contain an immaterial substance that cannot be accounted for
by the brain or by neurophysiological events in the brain.
The implications of this assertion are profound given the remark by John McCarthy that even
machines (certainly only a physical thing) such as thermostats can be said to have certain beliefs.
ST I, 75, 1.
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CHAPTER 4
THOMISTIC DUALISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM
The focus of this chapter wiU be on human freedom, which is the second issue in
the current mind-body debate being studied by this thesis. Like human consciousness,
human freedom has been a topic of considerable debate for quite some time. Yet, this
debate has made little progress since no consensus exists on what exactly human freedom
is or whether it actually exists. The objective of this chapter is to examine several of the
key approaches to human freedom found in the current mind-body debate, determining
the persuasiveness of these arguments for these positions in light of Thomistic dualism.
The first segment of this chapter has a four-fold aim: a.) to briefly examine the
types of human freedom and demonstrate the importance of libertarian freedom to the
mind-body debate; b.) to identify the particular elements of libertarian human freedom;
c.) to outline the problem of human freedom resulting from the law ofphysical
determinism; and d.) to identify and examine the three main interpretations used in the
current mind-body debate to solve the problem of human freedom. The second segment
of this chapter will analyze the hard deterministic interpretations of the problem of
human freedom of B. F. Skinner and Francis Crick. The third segment will examine John
Searle and Roger Penrose's compatibilist interpretation of the problem of human
freedom. The final segment will explore John Searle's rejection of the major solutions to
the problem of human freedom, examine his own proposal and offer a critique in favor of
the composite dualism of Thomas Aquinas.
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What is Human Freedom?
Because of the vigorous debate conceming human freedom, the current mind-
body debate has defined human freedom into several different categories. Essentially, a
person may be regarded as free in three ways. First, human beings may possess political
freedom if, because of favorable political circumstances, they are governed by their own
consent and have an opportunity to participate in governmental policies and actions.
'
Second, human beings may be regarded as morallyfree. In this sense, a person has the
ability to choose as they ought in regards to moral virtues that are in accordance with
human nature. Third, human beings are regarded as free in regards to having the ability
of self-determination. This third way is closely tied in with the second. Hence, moral
freedom may be regarded as a result of self-determination. This sense of freedom
maintains a person's identity as a free agent in regards to "the origins and conditions" of
behavioral choices. It is this final definition or type of human freedom (the ability to
freely choose one's own actions) with which this chapter is chiefly concemed.
There are several elements of human freedom interpreted as the ability for human
individuals to make free choices (or self-determination) that are not causally determined.
One condition of freedom requires that physical events and actions do not causally
determine the actions of a free moral agent. In other words, a human agent is able to
make free choices that are not causally pre-determined based on physical substances or
events. A second condition of human freedom maintains that a person has the ability to
' It is understood that the definition ofpolitical freedom is a Compatibilist idea of freedom, whereas the
definitions ofmoral freedom and self-determination are libertarian. This is necessary since humans live in
political societies with other free agents, which necessarily will involve differences or compromise at one
time or another. The alternative, of course, would be a non-political society - a Hobbesian world.
^ Robert Audi, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 280.
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make free choices that are not based on coercion by an outside force. A third condition
often found with this interpretation refers to the moral dimension of human freedom.
This moral dimension maintains that an agent is ultimately responsibility for his actions
made as a result of human freedom. A final element is that many who argue for this type
of human fi-eedom understand it to be inherent in human nature. Accordingly, this type
of freedom is often referred to as natural freedom. For Adler, natural freedom must
consist in the freedom of the will, or the ability to choose one thought or action over
another. "Having this freedom, our actions are not instinctively determined or
completely conditioned by the impact of external circumstances on our enviroimient, as is
the case in the behavior of other animals."^
However, this interpretation is not shared by all. Prior to the Enlightenment, few
philosophers, theologians, and scientists challenged the notion that human beings have
this type of freedom. But, with the rise of science and the use of the scientific method in
studying human behavior and human physiology, the idea ofphysical determinism has
convinced some to doubt the reality of libertarian human freedom.
In relation to the mind-body issue, the problem of human freedom originates from
the supposed deterministic nature of the universe, which is claimed by some to reflate the
reality of human freedom. The problematic nature of human freedom in a deterministic
universe is often presented by referring to the law ofphysical determinism. This law
maintains that since every event in the universe is caused by previous events, there can be
no freedom of the will in the sense that one is truly free to make decisions that are not
^ Mortimer J. Adler, Six Great Ideas. (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 141.
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determined by an outside influence, such as a mechanistic cause."* This law is often given
a logical formula that resembles the following. In any event e, there will be an
antecedent state of nature, A^, coupled with a law of nature, L, such that, given the
conditions resulting from A'^ and L, e will be the result. For instance, suppose N is Boris,
the aforementioned cat of Chapter 3; that he is walking across the living room and notices
an electrical outlet in the wall next to him. Presume that there exists a law of nature, L,
which causes cats to stick their paws into electrical outlets. Now, given these conditions
(based on A'^ and L), the result will be e, Boris suffering from an electric shock and, most
likely, electrocution. Therefore, according to hard determinism, no events or actions can
be truly free because all events are causally determined by physical laws and pre-existing
physical states. This application of the law ofphysical determinism has become a
predominant approach to the relationship between science and the problem of human
freedom. One reason such confidence was given to the causal succession of events was
because of the apparently objective and autonomous nature of those events from the
perspective of human observers.^
Others, however, have attempted to assert the reality ofhuman freedom despite
the deterministic character of the physical universe. In order to solve the apparent
conflict between physical determinism and human freedom there have been three main
interpretations of the true nature of human freedom: hard determinism, soft determinism,
�* Richard Swinbume defines physical determinism as "the thesis that every physical event (which does
not have a mental event as part of its cause) has a cause, a prior event which necessitates its occurrence in
all its detail." Cf The Evolution of the Soul. 2"'' ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 233-234.
' Werner Heisenberg, Across the Frontiers. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 216. Heisenberg is
calling attention to the seeming autonomous nature of the universe outside of human experience. This is
one reason why Heisenberg believes that modem science has been so successful in its ability to describe the
true nature of physical reality.
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and libertarianism. Hard determinism would describe a free action as one which has no
cause whatsoever. However, hard determinism maintains that human freedom is an
illusion because, according to the law of physical determinist, all types of human
behavior may be understood as causally conditioned and determined. Many twentieth
century scientists, philosophers, and psychologists who are convinced of the completely
causal nature of the universe have defended this position. Li order to philosophically
defend the idea that human freedom is illusory the hard determinist points to the law of
physical determinism.^ Hence, the hard determinist places human choices entirely within
the realm of the causally connected physical universe. In other words, because science
indicates that the law ofphysical determinism is universal and applies to all events,
human actions and choices carmot be free, but are, in fact, causally determined.
Soft determinism, often referred to as compatibilism, takes a different approach.
The soft determinist maintains that the qualities necessary for a free choice are entirely
compatible with the law ofphysical determinism. Many philosophers during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, and Hume,
defended this position, along with theologians, such as Jonathan Edwards.' Soft
determinism often understands freedom along the lines of "the power of doing or
refraining from an action according to what one wills, so that by choosing otherwise one
would have done otherwise." In other words a person fails to act freely when prevented
from acting as he chooses through manipulation or compulsion, or is forced into acting
* Bertrand Russell, Why I am Not a Christian. (New York: Touchstone, 1957), 38.
^ William J. Abraham, An Introduction to the Philosophy ofReligion. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1985), 145-148. Abraham presents a general but persuasive argument against several types of soft
determinism often found in Calvinistic theology.
* Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophv 28 1 .
against his will through coercion. That previous physical events and states causally
determined a person's actions are considered irrelevant by the soft determinist.
Ultimately, soft determinism locates fi-eedom entirely in the will. So long as a person's
will is not violated then they are to be considered free, even though other outside causes
(such as physical states or events) leave them no real choice to act otherwise.
Libertarianism, on the other hand, maintains that a rational human agent is by
nature a free agent, and as a free agent has a real choice. This position rejects the
arguments of the hard determinist conceming the causal nature of human actions and
behavior, and considers the compatibilist position as an evasion of the tme nature of
human freedom. There have been two main attempts to preserve the notion of human
freedom in face of the law of physical determinism. The German idealist, Immanuel
Kant, attempted to accomplish this by compartmentalizing a person into two parts, a
noumenal self and a phenomenal self. Since the phenomenal self is part of the physical
universe and physically determined, it is not free. However, since the noumenal self is
immaterial, the rational self is capable of free action. Those who state that the conflict
between the law of physical determinism and the universal experience of human freedom
is only apparent often take a different approach. Libertarians allow that a conflict would
exist if all things were pre-determined. However, the libertarian maintains that some
things, such as human free will, are not determined. Therefore, in order to maintain
human freedom advocates of this position often postulate the existence of a new category
of human actions, such as uncaused acts of volition based on human rationality. These
attempts are not universally accepted, and leave unanswered the question whether
libertarian human freedom is real.
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Initially, it could be argued that the libertarian is attempting to avoid the
conclusion that seems inevitable based on the known physical laws that govern the
universe. However, there are two aspects of human freedom that serve as strong reasons
for supporting the libertarian concept of human freedom. First, libertarian human
freedom seems to be a universal human experience. A person always has the opportunity
to prove someone else wrong if they attempt to predict a fiiture act or behavioral pattem.
For instance, suppose that one of the owners ofBoris, say the wife, is going away for an
extended period of time due to business. Prior to leaving she instmcts her husband to
feed the cat as soon as he arrives home from work each day she is gone, suggesting that
feeding the cat is now his responsibility since she caimot feed the cat while away, and to
consider her feelings if the cat starves. It is perfectly possible for the husband to say to
himself, "I'll show her; I won't feed the cat at all!" Under the libertarian concept of
freedom the free action of choosing to feed or not to feed Boris is necessarily dependent
on the husband's ability to make this decision on his own and absent any manipulation
(such as a post-hypnotic suggestion) or coercion (such as forcing him at gunpoint). This
aspect of libertarian freedom is specifically related to humans as rational creatures, since
such indeterminate behavior is not witnessed in inanimate objects, such as rocks and
lakes,' or even by non-rational living creatures, such as trees, goldfish or cats.'�
Second, libertarian human freedom is necessary in order for humanity's
understanding of justice and responsibility to make sense. This involves the moral
' Searle mentions this conceming inanimate objects, saying that the option to do something other than
what is done "is simply not open to glaciers moving down mountainsides or balls rolling down inclined
planes or the planets moving in their elliptical orbits." Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984), 88.
'� This is based on the non-rational character of animal thought and behavior described in the previous
chapter. In other words, lower animals act and behave according to instinct and not free choice.
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dimension to human freedom mentioned above. If humans are to be truly considered
morally responsible for their actions, then it follows that humans must have the ability to
choose a morally good act (such as feeding the hungry cat) over a morally repugnant act
(such as letting the cat starve). Hence, if a person has no ultimate power over their
actions or decisions, how can that person be held morally responsible for those actions
and the consequences which result?
So far this chapter has defined human freedom, identified and explored its major
elements and provided a few reasons why libertarian human freedom is defended. The
remainder of this chapter will focus attention on three interpretations regarding human
freedom found in current literature on the mind-body debate. These arguments, provided
by Francis Crick, B. F. Skinner, John Searle, Roger Penrose, and Richard Swinbume, will
be outlined and evaluated in light of the composite dualism of Thomas Aquinas.
Hard Determinism and Human Freedom: Skinner and Crick
As stated above, many recent attempts to solve the problem of human fi-eedom
have endeavored to illustrate that human freedom is illusory. Most of these attempts
have appealed to the law ofphysical determinism in order to demonstrate that the
libertarian concept of freedom is incorrect. This section will analyze the arguments
against libertarian human fi-eedom advanced by B. F. Skinner and Francis Crick and
critique them according to the Thomistic account of human fi-eedom based on Aquinas's
composite dualism.
B. F. Skirmer's argument against human freedom is a good example of how a hard
determinist applies the law of physical determinism to human behavior and uses it to
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deny the notion of hbertarian freedom. In order to properly understand and critique
Skinner's interpretation of human freedom it is necessary to examine his understanding
of these phenomena. It is clear that Skinner reduces the idea of human fi-eedom to "forms
of behavior which have proved useful in reducing various threats to the individual and
hence to the species in the course of evolution."' ' Based on this understanding of human
freedom Skirmer presents two basic arguments on which his attack against human
freedom is based. The first is a historical argument. Skinner traces the progressive
nature of scientific inquiry to illustrate how certain beliefs in the past have been proven
false. He then applies this argument to the problem of human freedom. For instance.
Skinner points out that it was once believed "that a projectile was carried forward by an
impetus, sometimes called an 'impetuosity.'"'^ Skirmer also mentions that Aristotle and
Zeno considered human thought to be of divine origin.'^ These beliefs, of course, were
eventually abandoned in favor of a more scientific and accurate understanding of the
nature of the world. Hence, "[pjhysics and biology moved farther away from personified
causes when they began to attribute the behavior of things to essences, qualities, or
natures."''* Consequently, Skinner maintains, those involved in studying the problem of
human freedom "cannot take that line today, and the commonest alternative is to appeal
to antecedent physical events."'^ However, Skinner bemoans, many people in the field of
behavior sciences continue to appeal to some sort of internal state to account for human
" B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity. (New York: Knopf, 1971), 26.
Ibid., 8.
" Ibid., 11.
" Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 11.
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behavior and actions.'^ Consequently, Skinner concludes, "[ajlmost everyone who is
concemed with human affairs . . . continues to talk about human behavior in this
prescientific way."'^
However, this argument is not strongly compelling. First, in order to strengthen
his conclusion, Skinner presents an ad hominem argument by assailing the intelligence of
those who continue to hold to a non-deterministic basis for human behavior. Since
"intelligent people" no longer believe that men are possessed by demons, Skirmer argues,
all intelligent people should also abandon the idea of a non-materialistic and deterministic
account of human behavior.'* But, in fact, many intelligent people continue to maintain
their belief in human freedom. Skinner's historical argument also fails by assuming that
human nature is to be entirely understood by physical processes. In other words, what
was discovered to be tme of projectiles will also be tme of human thought and behavior.
However, Skinner fails to establish this; he simply assumes it to be tme. In fact, all of
human experience leads one to the conclusion that human behavior is not predictable in
the same way the behavior of billiard balls may be predicted. Second, Skinner's
argument is open to objection because it assumes premises necessary for his conclusion.
Skinner simply assumes that human behavior can be investigated, measured, and
completely determined through scientific examination. However, he does not attempt to
demonstrate why this is so. Further, given the universal experience of human freedom, it
is uncertain how such an assertion could be demonstrated.
Skinner, 8.
" Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 8.
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The next argument is a biological one. Here, Skinner asserts that a person's
"genetic endowment, a product of the evolution of the species, is said to explain part of
the workings of his mind and his personal history the rest."*' According to Skinner, it is
the genetic code and environmental stimulus that foster the illusion of human freedom.^''
"Man's struggle for freedom is not due to a will to be free, but to certain behavioral
processes characteristic of the human organism, the chief effect ofwhich is the avoidance
of or escape from so-called 'aversive' features of the environment."'^' Skinner further
argues that a "scientific analysis of behavior dispossesses autonomous man and turns the
control he has been said to exert over to the environment."^'^ Skinner even considers the
literature and arguments promoting various ideas of freedom to be part of this stimulus.
Hence, it is wrong to consider these items to be imparting a philosophy to people.
Rather, such stimulus "induces people to act."'^^ One reason for this. Skinner maintains,
is that those advocates of human freedom have "never come to grips with techniques of
control which do not generate escape or counterattack because it has dealt with the
problems in terms of states or minds or feelings."^'* Skinner then links human freedom
with human self-knowledge, arguing that human society often encourages self-
observation which results in the inaccurate belief that humans are free creatures. Skinner
then argues that human self-knowledge (or human consciousness) "is valuable only to the
" Skinner, 11.
^" Ibid., 29.
^' Ibid., 42.
Ibid., 205.
" Ibid., 30.
Ibid., 36-37.
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extent that it helps to meet the contingencies under which it has arisen.
"'^^ In other words,
human consciousness is one of the principle causes of the belief in human freedom.
However, this argument is not entirely persuasive either. According to the theory
of evolution, natural selection rewards those members of a species that can produce
viable offspring. As stated above. Skinner maintains that the illusion of human freedom
is simply another form of behavior that natural selection produced in order to reduce the
threat of extinction in the human species. Yet, it is not clear how abstract mental
abilities, such as self-knowledge (consciousness) and the belief in libertarian freedom
significantly aid the human species over and against other animal species. This is
important since other animal species fail to exhibit behavior that would demonstrate the
ability for self-knowledge and self-determination, though they do exhibit behaviors
beneficial for survival, such as those based on sensory knowledge and instinct. In fact,
natural science has so far been unable to provide evidence that abstract mental powers are
the product of natural selection. Skinner assumes this fact, but does not provide
sufficient support for it. In order to demonstrate the implausibility of Skinner's
reasoning, consider the following thought experiment conceming a prehistoric hominid
named Paul. In order to survive and produce offspring it is necessary for Paul to display
good tiger-avoidance behavior.^^ However, there are a great number ofways in which
natural selection could encourage such behavior and not have him display such abilities
as self-knowledge and freedom. In fact, just such tiger-avoidance behaviors, which are
not based on self-awareness, are daily demonstrated by, for example, antelopes, or
Skinner, 193.
This thought experiment is derived from Alvin Plantinga in his book Warrant and Proper Function.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 212-232.
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zebras. Yet, such creatures do not exhibit behavior that would lead one to believe that
they possess self-awareness and libertarian freedom. Recall the principle from Aquinas
that states that one is able to identify the nature (or soul) of a creature through its
behavior or actions. Only humanity displays behavior that would suggest that it
possesses self-awareness and libertarian freedom. If abstract mental abilities, such as
self-awareness and libertarian freedom, were useful simply for producing survival-
enhancing behavior and selected by evolution, then one would logically expect to find
this behavior in, at least, several species. However, only humans exhibit such mental
abilities. Given this, it seems implausible that natural selection would produce such
characteristics in only one species.^^ Yet, why would evolution even select for the
illusion of freedom? Skinner's attempt to invoke natural selection as the means by which
human consciousness is established, which in turn causes the belief in freedom, fails to
adequately account for libertarian human freedom. How, for example, could natural
selection produce human self-knowledge? And, in turn, why would human self-
knowledge produce the illusion of libertarian freedom? It seems that, just prior to his
death. Skinner began to realize this when he remarked that "[e]volutionary theorists have
suggested that 'conscious intelligence' is an evolved trait, but they have never shown
how a nonphysical variation could arise to be selected by physical contingencies of
survival."^* What Skinner says of consciousness also could be said of libertarian
freedom. Unless and until evolutionary explanations for human freedom produce a
^' A. R. Wallace, co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection, observed wrote: "Natural selection
could only have endowed savage man with a brain a little superior to an ape, whereas he actually possesses
one little inferior to that of a philosopher." Quoted by John Polkinghome, The Faith of a Physicist.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 17.
Quoted by J. P. Moreland, "Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Consciousness."
Faith and Philosophv 15 no. 1 (January 1998), 87.
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theory which accounts for how and why the experience of freedom evolved, it is difficult
to accept this explanation of human freedom.
Skinner's biological argument appears to be persuasive only to those who agree
with his mechanistic and deterministic account of human behavior. In addition, it is
unclear how he could provide a persuasive reason for assuming that natural selection
would produce self-knowledge, and consequently the illusion of fi-eedom, in human
beings.
Further, Skinner's position necessitates that both of the main reasons for the belief
in human freedom are to be considered deceptive and misleading. Skinner attempts to
show that the universal experience of human freedom is to be understood within the
concepts of behavioral characteristics induced by either positive or negative
reinforcement. From this it follows that the common human experiences of justice and
morality are also to be considered unreal. According to Skinner's argument, morality is
reducible to modified behavioral changes brought about by the environment.^' However,
neither of Skirmer' s arguments seems persuasive enough to justify his extreme opinion
that negates a universally held experience of human freedom. The principle of credulity,
which states that in the absence of strong counter-evidence things are likely to be as they
appear, applies here. Since Skinner does not provide strong evidence to undermine the
universal experience of libertarian freedom, it logically follows that the experience of
libertarian freedom is most likely true experience of reality.
Skinner's two main arguments for his interpretation of the problem of human
freedom suffer from two problems themselves. First, his historical argument assumes as
Skinner, 184.
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one of its premises the conclusion he wishes to reach - that freedom is illusory because
human behavior is entirely determined by physical states and events based on the genetic
code and environmental conditions of each individual. Second, his biological argument
fails to adequately account for how or why natural selection would produce such abstract
and complex abilities and thought processes, as self-knowledge and the false belief in
self-determination. Overall, Skinner's arguments in favor of his proposed solution to the
problem of human freedom are illogical and unscientific.
The next argument by a hard determinist against libertarian freedom to be
investigated is that of Francis Crick. Crick defines human freedom merely as the "feeling
that one is free to make personal choices."^� Crick writes, it is "our undeniable feeling
that our Will is free," indicating that belief in human freedom is a universally shared
human experience.^' Despite this. Crick asserts, along with other hard determinists, that
human freedom is completely illusory. In fact. Crick maintains that a person's "sense of
personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of
nerve cells and their associated molecules." From this understanding Crick identifies
two key questions. The first question is whether a neural correlate can be found that
sufficiently explains the common human phenomena of free will. The second question is
33
whether it can be demonstrated that the human will "only appears to be free." Crick
goes on to state, "I believe that ifwe first solve the problem of our awareness (or
^� Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Searcii for the Soul. (New York: Scribner's, 1994),
273.
^' Ibid., 10.
" Ibid., 3.
" Ibid., 10.
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consciousness), the explanation of Free Will is likely to be easier to solve."'''*
Unfortunately, Crick's attempt to solve the problem of freedom is based solely on
scientific principles and investigations, which causes problems for his argument.
Crick provides three assumptions from which emerge his conclusion conceming
his understanding of human freedom. The first assumption is that there is a part of the
brain that is concemed with making plans for future actions.''^ His second assumption is
that a person is not aware of the neural computations necessary in order for the brain to
make decisions and plans. His third assumption is that a person has an awareness of the
decision made, but not of the computations that went into making the decision. The
details of Crick's arguments in favor of this position are quite complex and do not need to
be examined at length here. The point Crick wishes to make about freedom is that such a
person would have the illusion of free will. In this manner, Crick wishes to reduce
human freedom to specific neural firings in the same way he reduced human
consciousness.
However, Crick's argument seems to suffer from several philosophical dilemmas.
First, despite Crick's assertion that he wishes to propose a reductionistic interpretation of
the problem of human freedom (and thereby illustrate that it is illusory), he actually bases
his proposal on a type of causal emergentism.^^ This renders his proposal inconsistent. It
is also unclear how Crick's position could provide a purely materialistic account of
human freedom. If human behavior cannot be predicted in a purely mechanistic manner.
Crick, 10.
" Crick outlines these assumptions on pages 266-267 in The Astonishing Hypothesis.
John R. Searle, "The Mystery ofConsciousness," The New York Reyiew. 2 Nov., 1995, 62-64.
Searle offers a persuasive argument for this reinterpretation of Crick's data and argument.
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how can human behavior be reduced to purely physical phenomena? Further, despite his
attempt to demonstrate that human freedom is unreal, Crick's conclusion does not
necessarily follow from the assumptions that serve as his premises. In other words, a
scientific theory that lacks predictive power is simply not a valid scientific theory.
Finally, Crick's argument leaves the reader uncertain how such a conclusion could be
reached even if those premises were reworded or reworked.
Overall, Crick's argument fails to sufficiently account for the common human
experience of free will or self-determination. Skinner's argument suffers from the same
problem. Despite the scientific complexity and the biological basis on which their
theories rest, both Crick and Skinner have failed to offer a more persuasive account of
human freedom than Aquinas does. As established in Chapter 2, Aquinas understood the
human soul - the living principle of life - to be the locus of human consciousness and
freedom.^^ Unlike Crick's claim that the illusion of free will is directly caused by
conscious thought, Aquinas maintains that the intellect and the will work together to form
the soul's knowledge and desire for certain objects - whether they be objects of thought
(such as truth) or objects ofphysicality (such as water). Aquinas's account of human
rationality, which is a common element of human nature, being the basis for the universal
experience of human freedom provides a more plausible reason for why all humans
believe that their will is free.
Further, Crick's posifion corresponds to Skinner's, which requires that, along with
the common experience of human freedom, one must consider the universal human sense
ofmorality and justice to be illusory as well. Yet Aquinas's basis for human freedom
Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 216.
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provides a more compelling reason for why humanity has a sense of justice and
responsibility in regards to free choices. Since humans are creatures endowed with
rational souls, it follows that each person is morally responsible for those choices. These
two reasons together also provide another reason for following Aquinas's interpretation
of human freedom rather than Skinner's or Crick's. Aquinas's solution to the problem of
human freedom is more persuasive for two reasons. First, it is a more simple solution,
and accounts for human freedom through self-evident elements of human nature - the
intellect and the will. In a sense, Ockham's razor could be applied to Aquinas's
argument: Aquinas's interpretation ofhuman freedom is the simplest adequate solution to
the problem of human freedom outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Second,
Aquinas's solution also sufficiently accounts for the moral responsibility human freedom
entails. For Aquinas, human morality is a natural outcome ofhuman rationality, rather
than a deception brought about by human environmental conditioning and genetic
encoding.
Compatibilism and Human Freedom: Penrose
The focus of this chapter will now shift to Roger Penrose's approach to the
problem of human freedom. This segment has three main objectives. First, to identify
Penrose's type of proposed solution according to the classifications presented earlier in
this chapter. Second, to outline and analyze the main components of his interpretation of
the problem of human freedom. Third, to critically examine his solution and conclusions
conceming human freedom.
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As stated in Chapter 3, Penrose beheves that if human consciousness could be
understood by classical physics it would be able to be duplicated in a mathematical or
computational model. Penrose wants to argue that this same claim also applies to human
behavior and the problem of human freedom. Yet, Penrose maintains that if this were the
case the problem of human freedom would be answerable by the hard determinists.
Though Penrose recognizes that the actions of human beings are substantially determined
by heredity and environment, he opposes the hard determinist' s claim that human
behavior is entirely explicable by these factors.^* Instead, Penrose offers a modification
of the traditional compatibilist (or soft determinist) solution to the problem of human
freedom that is based on his understanding of recent developments in quantum theory.
There are two main components which comprise Penrose's modified compatibilist
solution to the problem of human fireedom. The first element relates to a common error
that Penrose believes is inherent to most deterministic accounts of human behavior, and
concems the idea of computability. Computability refers to the ability to mathematically
predict certain outcomes, whether theoretical or physical. In relation to the problem of
human freedom, Penrose recognizes, hard determinism claims the same ability as
computability in mathematics. However, Penrose believes that this is a mistake.
In philosophical discussions, free will has always been talked about in terms of
determinism. In other words, 'Is our future determined by our past?' and issues of
that nature. It seems to me that there are lots of other questions which might be
asked. For example, 'Is the fiature determined computably by the past?' - that is a
different question.^'
Roger Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 124.
Ibid., 124.
81
Utilizing a mathematical theorem by Robert Berger, Penrose establishes that no computer
action exists which can simulate the evolution of the universe.'*^ Hence, Penrose
concludes that it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between computability and strict
determinism."** From this basis, Penrose argues that, despite a mechanistic universe, there
must still exist a randomizing element of the universe that challenges the notion of strict
mechanistic determinism.
The second component of Penrose's solution to the problem of human freedom is
the identification of this random element, which he calls quantum non-locality. Quantum
non-locality, according to Penrose, relates to "the quantum-mechanical description" of
the possibilities that are open for the position of an electron in an atom.'*^ "Not only
might the electron have one or another particular location, but it might alternatively have
any one of a number of possible states, in which, in some clear sense, it occupies both
locations simultaneously.""*^ Penrose asserts that current theories of quantum physics
make it "very difficult to understand quantum non-locality within the framework of
Special Relativity.""*"* Therefore, a radical new theory is required. "This new theory will
not just be a slight modification of quantum mechanics but something as different from
standard quantum mechanics as General Relativity is different from Newtonian
gravity."'*^ This inability of current theories to account for quantum non-locality leads
Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. 1 19.
Ibid.
^'^
Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 258.
Ibid.
Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. 137.
Ibid.
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Penrose to consider that "the true quantum gravity theory might be non-computable."'*^
For evidence of this, Penrose points to the new Geroch-Hartle model of the universe,
which has, as a fundamental element, a non-computational element in it.'*^ Ultimately,
according to Penrose's theory, in order to solve the problem of human freedom, "a
completely different conceptual framework" is necessary."** Accordingly, "quantvmi non-
locality would be built into the theory.""*'
Despite its originality and resourcefulness, there are several problems with
Penrose's proposed solution to the problem of human freedom. First, his approach to the
problem of human freedom is not a true proposal at all. By referring to an undetermined
and non-existent radical new theory of quantum gravity, Penrose's only achievement is to
push the problem away. In other words, he avoids the problem, rather than attempting to
solve it. This is not to say that Penrose completely ignores the problem. In fact, he has a
good understanding of the physical law of determinism and the universal experience of
human freedom. However, he is unable to resolve the apparent divergence between the
deterministic character of the world and human behavior, even within his own model.
Instead, in order to solve the problem of human freedom while maintaining his
mechanistic understanding of the universe, he appeals to a model which has not been
established, and which may not ever be fully developed or correspond to reality.
Second, Penrose's proposal contains three unconfirmed assumptions. First, he
fails to account for the possibility that a hature modification ofGeneral Relativity or
Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. 120.
Ibid.
Ibid., 137.
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current quantum mechanics may explain the phenomena of quantum non-locality. He
seems to assume that the current model can never properly account for the phenomena of
quantum non-locality. The second assumption relates to Penrose's failure to account for
the possibility of a non-quantum solution to the uncertainty principle (or quantimi non-
locality). He merely assumes that a radical new theory is required. Finally, Penrose
assumes the mechanistic nature of the universe. Consequently, the libertarian solution to
the problem of human freedom is immediately rejected without thoughtful consideration.
Based on these problems, it appears to be safe to assert that Aquinas's proposal
may be a better solution to the problem of human freedom for at least two reasons. First,
rather than appealing to a non-existent theory that may not correspond to reality, Aquinas
bases his approach to human freedom on a proposal that is more philosophically sound.
Unlike Penrose, who must appeal to a yet-to-be-determined theory, Aquinas offers both
theoretical and experiential evidence to support his composite dualistic solution to the
problem of human freedom.^' Second, Aquinas's explanation of human freedom better
accounts for the moral dimension of human freedom. Like Skinner, Penrose's position
seems to understand the moral dimensions of human behavior to be based on heredity and
environment, that is the environment of quantum indeterminacy passed on through the
natural process of genetic evolution. In other words, both deny any actual moral
dimension to human behavior. In contrast, Aquinas bases the moral dimension of human
Mortimer J. Adler has offered such an account for the uncertainty principle. He maintains that any
attempt to view the atom, or other elementary particles, at the quantum level changes the state of the object
attempting to be viewed. Cf Truth in Religion: The Pluralitv ofReligions and the Unity ofTruth. (New
York: Macmillan, 1990), 93-100.
^' ST I-II, 18, 9.
" Penrose. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. 124.
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behavior on the soul's intellectual and appetitive powers, as well as the soul's ability to
make volitional actions in accordance to those powers. Further arguments against a
position similar to Penrose's will be discussed in the following segment which will deal
with John Searle's approach to the problem of human freedom.
Searle and the Problem of Human Freedom
Searle provides a strong philosophical analysis of the various modem attempts at
solving the problem of human freedom in Minds, Brains and Science. Searle describes
the problem of human freedom in the following manner.
The problem about the freedom of the will is not about whether or not there are
inner psychological reasons that cause us to do things as well as extemal physical
causes and inner compulsions. Rather, it is about whether or not the causes of our
behaviour, whatever they are, are sufficient to determine the behaviour so that
things have to happen the way they do happen.
Interestingly, Searle rejects each of the major interpretations relating to the problem of
human freedom - hard determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. The final
segment of this chapter will explore the reasons for Searle's rejection of the solutions to
the problem of human freedom identified at the beginning of this chapter, and analyze
and critique his understanding ofwhy the problem of human freedom will continue to
remain a problem.
Searle's main reason for rejecting the hard deterministic interpretation is based on
the universal and psychological experience of human freedom. "As many philosophers
have pointed out, if there is any fact of experience that we are all familiar with, it's the
simple fact that our own choices, decisions, reasonings, and cogitations seem to make a
John Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 89.
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difference to our actual behaviour."^"* Therefore, Searle maintains, "Human freedom is
just a fact of experience."^^ Yet, Searle is quite aware of the problem the law of physical
determinism poses to the idea of human freedom. Yet, despite the seeming large-scale
predictable nature of the world, the non-predictable behavior observed in human beings is
not comparable to glaciers moving down mountainsides and other events in nature that
are based on the law ofphysical determinism.
This is a characteristic philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, a set
of very powerful arguments force us to the conclusion that free will has no place
in the universe. On the other hand, a series ofpowerful arguments based on facts
of our own experience inclines us to the conclusion that there must be some
freedom of the will because we all experience it all the time.^^
Searle's argument provides two reasons for rejecting theories based on quantum
indeterminacy, such as the one by Roger Penrose described above. First, the ability of
quantum mechanics to describe nature is limited to the micro level - that is, the world of
quantum particles. Accordingly, any type of indeterminism detected at the quantum level
cannot support any theory of the freedom of the will. This is because "the statistical
indeterminacy at the level ofparticles does not show any indeterminacy at the level of
objects that matter to us - human bodies."^^ Therefore, any appeal, such as the one
provided by Roger Penrose, to quantum mechanics or quantum non-locality at the micro-
level, fails to properly account for human behavior at the macro-level. Second, even if
there were some indeterminacy ofparticles in the human brain, it does not follow that
Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. 87.
Ibid., 88. Searle goes on to assert that the "characteristic experience that gives us the conviction of
human freedom, and it is an experience from which we are unable to strip away the conviction of freedom,
is the experience of engaging in voluntary, intentional human actions," Minds. Brains and Science. 95.
Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. 88.
" Ibid., 87.
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that indeterminacy could force particles to change paths. Therefore, according to Searle,
theories based on quantum indeterminism caimot provide evidence that forms ofmental
energy, on which human freedom is based, could "move molecules in directions that they
were not otherwise going to move."^* Of course, this does not disprove such theories, but
Searle is philosophically correct in establishing that such theories fail to provide
persuasive reasons for adopting Penrose's theory over another one.
Traditional forms of compatibilism also pose philosophical problems for Searle.
As stated previously, compatibilism asserts that the qualities necessary for a choice to be
free are completely compatible with the law ofphysical determinism. Though previous
physical states or events causally determine a person's actions, this fact is considered
irrelevant by the compatibilist. Exploring such assumptions, Searle asks the question, "Is
it ever true to say of a person that he could have done otherwise, all other conditions
remaining the same?"^' For example, recall the couple who owns Boris the cat. Is it
possible for the husband to have chosen to feed the cat? Under the compatibilist solution
to the problem of human freedom, the answer would have to be no. That is because
choosing not to feed Boris was, in fact, determined. Such actions were determined "by
certain sorts of inner psychological causes (those which we call our 'reasons for acting')
and not by extemal forces or psychological compulsions."^^ The difficulty is that
compatibilism does not account for "for the ordinary notion of human freedom."^'
Another way to state this argument against compatibilism is to say that it attempts to
Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. 87.
5' Ibid., 89.
*� Ibid.
Ibid.
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solve the problem of human freedom by redefining what constitutes a free act. In other
words, traditional forms of compatibilism utilize a type of fallacy called persuasive
definition, which consists in redefining terms in order to establish an argument.
"Compatibilism, in short, denies the substance of free will while maintaining its shell. "^^
The universal experience of freedom, Searle asserts, is "the foundation stone" for
the belief in libertarian human freedom.^^ However, Searle's denial of libertarian human
freedom is based on two points. First, if libertarian freedom were true it would be
necessary to change science and philosophy's fiindamental beliefs about the nature of the
universe. For Searle, it would seem that libertarian freedom would necessitate the ability
for humans to make molecules divert from one path to another. This is because,
according to Searle, "there is not the slightest evidence to suppose that we should
abandon physical theory in favor of such a view."^"* Second, there is no compelling
reason to abandon the modem scientific and physical understanding of the universe.
Therefore, it does not seem that "there is any scope for the freedom of the will because on
this conception the mind can only affect nature in so far as it is a part of nature."^^
Moreover, Searle reasons, if "we accept this conception ofhow nature works, then it
doesn't seem that there is any scope for the freedom of the will because on this
conception the mind can only affect nature in so far as it is a part of nature."^^ Searle
Searle, Minds. Brains and Science. 89.
Ibid., 95.
Ibid., 92.
Ibid., 93.
Ibid.
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describes this view as biological naturalism.^^ For Searle, the libertarian notion of free
will violates the law of physical determinism. Essentially, Searle claims that modem
science, dominated by the law ofphysical determinism, demonstrates that the libertarian
notion of free will is incongment with nature and, hence, irrational.
However, Searle's argument against libertarian freedom contains some problems
which need to be addressed. First, Searle's rejection of libertarian freedom is almost
entirely based on the assumption that physical determinism is correct. For if human
beings were to actually possess free will, which is the common experience of all humans,
this would imply that two types of substances exist in the universe.^* Nonetheless, Searle
does not provide a compelling reason to disregard the common and universal experience
that human beings have the power to choose their actions. Despite the fact that modem
science has the ability to answer many questions regarding the physical operation of the
universe, Searle does not provide any evidence to support his eagemess to tip the balance
in favor of the law of physical determinism over human experience. Stewart Goetz, who
maintains that Searle's position is defective because of and motivated by his fear of
dualism, provides a second criticism of Searle's argument. Noting that Searle
emphasizes that causal reductionism does not necessitate ontological reductionism, Goetz
observes that Searle "wants the reader to believe that his conception of the mental is not
incompatible with the most obvious features of our mental life," such as intentionality.^'
John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,
1992), 1.
Ibid., 13.
Stewart Goetz, "Searle on the Mind: Does He Need Refutation or Help?," manuscript, 8. Paper
delivered on April 1 1, 1997, at the 1997 Midwestern Regional Meeting of the Society of Christian
Philosophers, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
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"What Searle asserts and what is the case, however, are two different things. While he
wants to keep some obvious features of the mental, he is willing to dispense with others
when he believes they have dualistic implications."^^ Therefore, Searle's argument
suffers from an internal inconsistency in his acceptance of various qualities of the mental
life. "Though it seems to us," Goetz concludes, "that we have free will, [Searle] is led to
deny that we do because of his fear of dualism."'* Such a fear is not a philosophically
justifiable reason to argue against any sort of dualistic understanding for the basis of
human fi-eedom. Second, Searle argues that libertarian human fi-eedom grants a person
the ability to change the pathways ofmolecules from one direction to another. For Searle
modem science has conclusively demonstrated that the universe "consists of particles and
their relationships with each other, and everything about the world can be accounted for
in terms of these particles and their relations." For this reason, Searle concludes that
the modem scientific understanding of the world leave no room for libertarian human
freedom. However, libertarian freedom maintains that freedom is not composed of or
based on molecules or their pathways. So how is this a problem? Searle is assigning a
property to libertarian freedom which it does not claim. Ultimately, absurd materialistic
reductionism ends up chasing its own tail by denying the universal experience of human
freedom. Again, as Goetz has observed, the only plausible reason why Searle would
assert this is because he assumes that any sort of dualistic understanding of human nature
is wrong. Searle even concedes that "[w]e are reluctant to concede any of the
� Goetz, 9.
" Ibid.
Ibid., 4.
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commonsense facts that sound 'Cartesian,' . . . ."'^ However, Searle is either unwilling
or unable to provide a rational justification for abandoning the 'commonsense' and
universal experience of libertarian human freedom.
Thomistic dualism offers two points relevant to issues brought up by Searle.
First, under Aquinas's conception of composite dualism Searle would not need to take
such radical steps in order to avoid dualism. As Goetz observes, the type of dualism that
Searle is wary of is Cartesian dualism. It would seem that Searle's chief concern is
relinquishing to the non-material substance ofmind complete control of the human being.
Aquinas wants to maintain that, since the rational soul is the form of the human body, the
non-material substance ofmind (or soul) animates the body. This conception of the
relation between the mind (soul) and the body is different than the Cartesian notion of the
mind (soul) as the motor of the body. The unity of the human person was a vital aspect
ofAquinas's composite dualism. This aspect ofAquinas's theory could serve as a bridge
between substance dualism (of the Cartesian-Platonic kind) and the attempt of soft
determinism (such as Searle's) to locate all human actions and behavior within physical
causes and events.
Second, Thomistic composite dualism takes seriously the universal experiential
nature of human freedom. Though there is not a direct correspondence between the
modem scientific belief that the law ofphysical determinism applies to all objects in the
universe equally and the medieval belief as God as the cause of all movement in the
universe, there are certain similarities between them. Aquinas's solution to the thirteenth
Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind. 13.
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century version of the law ofphysical determinism defends libertarian human freedom.
Aquinas maintains that because humans are rational beings, it follows that they have
freedom of the will.'^ However, this freedom has as its foundation the notion ofGod as
the first cause. According to Aquinas these two ideas are not mutually inconsistent. The
reason Aquinas maintains this is based on his understanding the nature ofGod as being
the first cause. Since God is the first cause of all things which exist, he therefore moves
"causes both natural and voluntary."'^
And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural,
so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions ofbeing
voluntary, but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in
each thing according to its own nature.'^
In other words, ifGod is the first cause of human actions being free in a libertarian sense,
then God's being the first cause of human freedom makes human freedom a libertarian
type of freedom, rather than illusory or psychologically compelled.
Though it is highly doubtful that Searle would accept these proposals outright,
Thomistic dualism both provides a rational and coherent alternative to the form of
dualism that Searle rejects (Cartesian dualism), and rescues him from the absurdity of
rejecting the universal human experience which he knows to be true. It seems clear that
Recently, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange has argued that internal inconsistencies in Aquinas's argument
make his view of human freedom a Compatibilist one. However, this thesis, based on the analysis found in
chapter two, has assumed as one of its premises that Aquinas's view of human freedom is libertarian. Cf
Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, frans. Alfred J. Freddoso, (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 62-70.
" It may be necessary to assert again that this is not a one-to-one relationship between these two views.
However, in relation to human freedom, the effects are the same.
^*ST I, 83, 1.
Peter J. Kreeft, The Summa of the Summa. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 299.
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Searle, and those who favor his solution to the problem of human freedom, need to take a
serious look at the account of human freedom in Thomistic dualism.
This chapter has briefly examined several modem proposals that attempt to solve
the problem of human freedom which results from the law of physical determinism
prevalent in both modem philosophy and science. It was demonstrated that, despite
several arguments against it from different philosophical and scientific perspectives on
the problem of human freedom, the Thomistic account of human freedom is not
philosophically irrational or incoherent. Rather, is advantageous in two areas: it is
philosophically rational and consistent, and it avoids the problems identified by those
who argue for a materialistic or deterministic account of human freedom. The next
chapter will examine perhaps the most significant aspect ofAquinas's proposed solution
to the mind-body problem - human destiny.
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CHAPTER 5
THOMISTIC DUALISM AND HUMAN DESTINY
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed human consciousness and human freedom, which are
the first two issues in the current mind-body debate being explored by this thesis. This
final chapter will focus on the third issue, human destiny, and consider it in relation to
three differing positions. For the purposes of this thesis, human destiny is understood as
the soul's (or individual) survival after death of the body. It is important to note that, for
Aquinas, "whether or not Fred's soul survives the death of Fred will depend on whether
God wills to keep it in being."' Nonetheless, Aquinas is convinced that it is God's nature
not to aimihilate any creature.
There are many different dimensions to human destiny which could be addressed
by this chapter. One dimension concems the various religious factors of human destiny
based on Christian theological reflection, such as the nature of the resurrection body, the
final destinations ofHeaven or Hell, and the possibility of an intermediate state.
However, there are two objectives for this chapter. The first objective is to determine
whether the idea of life after the death of the physical body - that is, any kind ofhuman
existence which transcends death - is both philosophically coherent and rationally
defensible. The second objective of this chapter is to determine ifAquinas presents a
more plausible proposal conceming human destiny than others do.
' Brian Davies, The Thought of Ttiomas Aquinas. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 216.
'ST I, 65, 1.
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For substance dualists the notion of the immortality of the soul is not an idea
which is hard to accept. In fact, such a view, to most substance dualists, would seem
rather obvious. However, in relation to Aquinas's composite dualism, the issue becomes
decidedly more difficult. Adler writes.
For those, like Plato and Descartes, who conceive the soul as an immaterial entity
having being in its own right, these questions can be immediately answered in
favor of the soul's capacity for separate existence. Only when the soul is
conceived as a form which, together with matter, constitutes the substance of a
living body, does there seem to be both meaning and difficulty to the question
whether the soul continues to endure separately when a plant, an animal, or a man
dies, i.e., when such composite substances decompose."
Unfortunately, many metaphysical materialists who are currently engaged in the
mind-body debate deny that any type of human existence beyond the death of the body is
possible."* Some might be willing to concede the bare possibility of such an existence,
but would find discussions on the subject basically incoherent since they would deny the
possibility of observing non-physical or trans-physical realities. Of course, if one denies
the existence of such a reality, it follows that one will not bother looking for it either.
Such denials are usually based on the following two assumption: that only material or
physical materials exist, and "scientific" studies of those materials are the only reliable
means of knowledge.^ This has the unfortunate consequence that Crick, Searle, Penrose,
and Skinner, because of such presuppositions, dismissing themselves from the
^ Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Ideas: A Lexicon ofWestern Thought. (New York: Macmillan, 1992),
809.
* One way in which metaphysical materialists could conceive of life after the death of the body is if, in
the distant future, some sort of advanced "super" technology could be utilized to collect and maintain
human thought patters in a computer. Of course, not all would agree with even this proposal.
' Aquinas calls into question similar assertions often found in the "modem" world when he wrote that
"it is the acme of stupidity for a man to suspect as false what is divinely revealed . . simply because it
cannot be investigated by reason." CG I, 3, 4.
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conversation. However, not all have left the table. Both philosophy and hard science
retain representatives who are willing to engage in rational speculation conceming the
issue of human survival after the death of the body. This chapter will examine and
critique their arguments on how to properly understand such an ultimate view of human
destiny.
The first segment of this chapter will describe and explore three human
aspirations which are universally shared by humans in various cultures, ages and
locations. It will be argued that these aspirations suggest that it may be possible for an
individual to survive after the death of his body. The second segment will identify and
argue in favor of several conditions necessary in order for the idea of a human destiny
beyond death to be philosophically coherent and rationally defensible. The third segment
will analyze and critique two objections to Aquinas's position on human destiny from
positions which, though closely associated, differ from the Thomistic account of human
destiny discussed in Chapter 2. This segment will also offer a brief final observation on
this thesis.
Human Destiny as the Fulfillment ofHuman Aspirations
In Chapter 2 it is was argued that there is a common human nature, and that this
nature may be understood through Aquinas's designation of the human soul as a rational
soul,^ which "is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local
movement; and likewise of our understanding."' As stated earlier, Aquinas's position
*ST 1, 78, 1.
^ST I, 76, 1.
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argues that its actions or behavior determines the nature of a creature. With Aquinas's
"rational soul" as the basis, this thesis has already established that human beings possess
an intellectual power (the intellect) and an appetitive power (the will).* Some ofwhat
flows from humanity's intellect and will are desires or aspirations towards certain
objects, whether they be objects of physicality (such as a new car), or objects of thought
(such as love or justice).' However, there are several aspirations which are experienced
universally by human beings in every age, culture, and location, and which seemingly
may be fulfilled in only one way. Three such aspirations are particularly relevant to the
objective of this chapter.
The first aspiration concems the desire for an ultimate justice and morality that is
beyond the physical life in this world. As established in Chapter 2, morality is a natural
and necessary outcome of human rationality and society. However, no matter how much
it is attempted, the degree of justice in this world carmot ultimately fulfill all of the
desires for justice generated by morality. There are two aspects of the human aspiration
for justice and morality which need to be explored. The first aspect is that perceptions of
justice and morality experienced in the world are often incorrect. Humans, being fallible
creatures, will undoubtedly make mistakes in areas of justice and morality. A judge or
jury may mistakenly impose a guilty verdict on an actually innocent person, consequently
inflicting an unjust punishment on that individual. The second aspect of justice and
morality is that such justice and morality as experienced in this world is often insufficient.
The feeling of loss, isolation, and pain at the death of a loved one to a dmnk driver carmot
* Cf. Discussion on the powers of the soul on pages 27-29 ofChapter 2.
' This is not to say that objects of thought, such as love, justice, beauty, cannot be experienced through
physical objects, but that these experiences originate in objects of thought and not physical things.
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be overcome by any amount of "justice" provided legally by the courts, or illegally
through vengeful retribution. Other, more general and common, forms of justice and
morality point towards the incomplete nature of temporal justice. John Polkinghome
wntes that "[b]elief in a human destiny beyond death stems . . . from the recognised
incompleteness of our lives in this world. All of us die with business unfinished, hurts
unhealed, potenfialities unrealised."'^ These unhealed hurts, unfinished potentials,
incomplete and incorrect applications of justice and morality provide a reason for
assuming that, if justice is tmly to be served and morality is to be more than mere
sophistry, justice and morality must not end at death. It seems a plausible assumption
that the desire for justice and morality would, therefore, be fijlfiUed beyond death. This
would entail that there is an existence beyond the death of the body, a destiny unique to
humans because of their rational nature, which allows ultimate justice and morality to be
experienced.
The second aspiration concems understanding the meaning of human existence
and the desire to achieve some ultimate purpose in life. It is a common human
experience to desire a meaning and purpose for life. One grand example of such a search
is found in the book of Ecclesiastes. This book is unique in that "[ujnlike all other books
of the Bible, it has no faith flashbulb attached to its camera to reveal the inner depths or
hidden meanings of life."'
' Here is mankind's search for ultimate meaning and purpose
uncovered. Throughout the book Qohelet asks the question, "Does my life have any
meaning at all?" Such a question illustrates modemity's greatest fear, a fear that,
'� Polkinghome, Belief in God in an Age of Science. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998),
23.
" Peter J. Kreeft, Three Philosophies of Life. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 19.
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ultimately, everything is meaningless. "Ecclesiastes is a terror to modem man because
when he looks into its mirror he sees the ultimate nightmare: The Man With No Face."'^
In his attempt to establish meaning and purpose in his life, Qohelet pursues wisdom,
pleasure, wealth and power, duty and honor, and piety. However, after traveling down
these roads as far as one can go, each of these is proven meaningless in the judgment of
Qohelet. "Vanity of vanities! All is vanity."'^ As Kreeft writes, "[i]f death is, as it
seems to be, the final end, then life's story is vanity with a vengeance. The cosmos has
been groaning in evolutionary travail with us, and we are only the cosmic abortion."'"'
Ecclesiastes profoundly illustrates that humanity (both as an individual and as a race)
searches for ultimate meaning and purpose. If death is the ultimate end of a human
being, then nothing matters at all.'^ The point to be made is this. If life is meaningless, if
death is the end, then why do human beings search for ultimate meaning and purpose?
Why do human beings throughout history desire for and seek after some sort of life after
death, or even etemal life?'^ It seems that all other animals in the world are desperate to
survive in order to produce offspring. Yet, humanity is concemed with the larger issue of
Kreeft, Three Philosophies of Life. 32.
Ecclesiastes 1:2.
Kreeft, Three Philosophies of Life. 47.
Polkinghome writes, "If cosmic history is no more than the temporary flourishing of remarkable
fiTiitfulness followed by its subsequent decay and disappearance, then I think Macbeth was right and it is
indeed a tale told by an idiot." Belief in God in an Age of Science. 21.
An ancient example of this is The Epic ofGilgamesh. The following are several lines by Gilgamesh
during his quest for etemal life after the death of his fi-iend Enkidu. "I am going to die! - am I not like
Enkidu?!" (75). "The issue ofEnkidu, my fi-iend, oppresses me, so I have been roaming long roads through
the wildemess. How can I stay silent, how can I be sfill? My friend whom I love has tiuned to clay. Am I
not like him? Will I lie down, never to get up again?" (85). Kovacs observes that, through such thoughts,
Gilgamesh "rebels against mortality" (xx). Maureen Gallery Kovacs, The Epic ofGilgamesh. (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1989).
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ultimate meaning, and not simply with species survival. It would seem that the reason for
this quest for meaning and purpose in humans is because there is some sort of existence
beyond the death of the body. For life to have an ultimate meaning and purpose, it is
necessary for there to be an existence beyond the death of the body. This seems a
plausible assumption. As Polkinghome writes:
The human paradox is that we perceive so many signs of value and
significance conveyed to us in our encounter with reality, yet all meaning is
threatened by the apparent finality of death. If the universe is tmly a cosmos, if
the world is really intelligible through and through, then this life by itself caimot
be the whole of the story."
The final aspiration concems the human quest for complete and ultimate
happiness. For Aquinas, complete and total happiness is only available as the summum
bonum, or ultimate good. "Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than
the vision of the Divine Essence." This may be established by understanding that
Aquinas maintains that individuals naturally desire through the will that which the
intellect understands as good. This is because humans achieve happiness through the
satisfaction of desires." For Aquinas, no desire is evil in and of itself, because the will
desires that which is understood as good. Of course, the human intellect may misidentify
a good as the ultimate good, and desire it in order to experience perfect happiness.
Unfortunately, in this maimer, that person will only experience a limited type of
happiness. For example, a person may believe that money is good, because with money
one may live a comfortable lifestyle. However, since a comfortable life is not the proper
Polkinghome, Belief in God in an Age of Science. 23.
''ST I-II, 3, 8. Cf CG4,79, II.
" ST I-II, 5, 8.
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end ofman, the desire for money and a comfortable life becomes evil. This is because it
moves the individual away from the ultimate and etemal good, which is God, and
towards a limited and temporal good. Therefore, Aquinas argues, "[hjappiness is the
attainment of the Perfect Good."^� There are three reasons why the human desire for
ultimate happiness (or the good) points to a human destiny beyond the death of the body.
First, the desire for ultimate happiness is universally shared by all rational souls. Aquinas
provides two reasons for this assertion. First, a person's intellect is capable of
apprehending the universal and perfect good, which is God.^' It was argued in Chapter 3
that the human mind, unlike all other animal minds, is capable of comprehending the idea
of infinity, or the infinite. Now, the infinite is an object of thought, and not a physical
object. Therefore, though there is nothing in the physical universe which properly can be
called infinite, the human mind is able to apprehend such an idea based on analogical
reasoning from objects in the world which are observed through the sense. Likewise,
the concept ofGod is an object of thought, though one cannot point to something
material and say, "That is God."^"* Second, a person's will is able to desire God, which is
the universal and perfect good. This is a variation on an old philosophical argument:
the human desire for water in order to quench a thirst is a plausible reason to assume the
^�ST 1-11,5, 1.
'' Ibid.
This refers back to Aquinas's notion, found originally in Aristotle, that all human knowledge is
mediated through the senses.
For Aquinas, God is not an object of human thought, while the idea of God is. Accordingly, it follows
that there is a Being who, if correct, corresponds to that concept. In this latter respect, the idea ofGod is
unlike the idea or concept of the infinite.
Of course, unless that person is mentally unstable.
" ST 1-11,5, 1.
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existence ofwater. In the same way, the human desire for ultimate happiness provides a
persuasive reason for assuming that is it possible for a person to achieve perfect
happiness.
The second reason is that ultimate happiness cannot be achieved in this life. In
order to demonstrate this, Aquinas provides three arguments. First, Aquinas maintains
that ultimate happiness is a perfect and sufficient good, and as such, necessarily excludes
every evil and fulfills every desire. However, he reasons, "this present life is subject to
many unavoidable evils: to ignorance on the part of the intellect, and to inordinate
27affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body." For
his second argument, Aquinas writes that the "natural desire of the rational creature is to
know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect." "Yet," Aquinas argues,
"if God were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth. He would
so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer
would be completely beautified."^' Aquinas summarizes this argument in the following
passage which deserves to be quoted in full.
God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated
from this moral life. The reason is, because as was said above (A. 4), the mode of
knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as
we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only
what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is
evident that the divine essence cannot be known through the nature ofmaterial
things. For it was shown above (AA. 2, 9) that the knowledge of God by means
ST I-II, 5, 3.
" Ibid.
ST I, 12, 8.
Ibid.
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of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
for the soul ofman in this life to see the essence ofGod.''^
Augustine echoes this same understanding of the implication of the human knowledge of
God in an often-quoted passage in his Confessions.
The person who knows all those matters [that is, all creatures] but is ignorant of
you is unhappy. The person who knows you, even if ignorant of natural science,
is happy. Indeed the one who knows both you and nature is not on that account
happier. You alone are his source of happiness . .
Third, the human desire for the good cannot be satisfied in this life. "For man naturally
desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass
away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to
hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have
true Happiness in this life." Kreeft states that the "value of this terrible truism of
Thomas' is that it heads us off from the desperate optimism of hunting for Heaven on
earth, which has always brought about enormous misery, both individually and socially,
while its traditional 'pessimism' . . . can produce a joyful detachment."
The third reason why the human desire for ultimate happiness argues in favor of
an existence beyond the death of the body is that the human desire for the summum
bonum is a desire for ultimate reality itself. It has already been established that Aquinas
understands the Beatific Vision to be the only way in which rational creatures could
^� ST I, 12, 11.
^' Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 5, 6. In
this passage, of course, Augustine understands happiness in a perfect sense, and not in a temporal or limited
sense.
ST I-II, 5,3. Peter Kreeft observed that in "all the arguments in the Summa this would seem to be . . .
the most obviously conclusive, since its premises are verified in everyone's experience every day . ..." A
Summa of the Summa. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 394.
" Peter J. Kreeft, A Summa of the Summa. 394.
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achieve perfect and complete happiness. Aquinas also maintains that humans carmot,
because their nature is to seek only the good (whether real or apparent), desire evil for
Itself. Those things which are desired by the human will which are evil, are desired
because the human intellect has mistaken them to be goods. Hence, all things which are
evil are, in fact, good things perverted. C. S. Lewis believed that evil has no objective
reality. "It is simply good spoiled. That is why I can say there can be good without evil,
but no evil without good."^"* Now, according to Aquinas, all rational agents move out of
intention towards an end.^^ Further, all creatures, whether they have rational knowledge
of it or not, move towards the final end because, "since everything desires its own
perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and
crowning good." For Aquinas, God is the final end of all things, because "He intends
only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; which is the likeness of the
divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things."
Now, since God is perfectly good, it is difficult to maintain that God would create
rational creatures which are oriented towards an end which they are incapable of
obtaining. With these principles established the following syllogism may be proposed.
Ultimate goodness (the summum bonum) is the proper end of a rational agent. That
proper end is, in fact, God. Hence, a person's desire for the proper end is a desire for
God. Yet, as was established above, man cannot fully achieve his proper end in this life.
^* C. S. Lewis, The Letters of C. S. Lewis to Arthur Greeves. Waiter Hooper, ed. (New York:
Macmillan, 1986), 465.
ST I-II, 1,2.
ST I-II 1,5.
" ST I, 44, 4.
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Therefore, it is necessary for there to be an existence beyond the death of the body in
order for man to achieve this proper end.
These three human aspirations - the desire for an ultimate justice and morality
beyond this life, the search for a meaning and purpose to human existence, and the quest
for complete and perfect happiness - each point to the same conclusion: that physical
death is not the end of human existence. Though these human aspirations do not prove
that there is life after death, together they present a persuasive and defensible argument in
favor of the conclusion that there is a human existence beyond the death of the body
which allows the possibility of these aspirations being fulfilled. This fulfills the first
objective of this chapter. Attention will now turn towards exploring whether Aquinas
presents a more plausible position than others do.
Several Conditions Necessary for Human Destinv Beyond Death
As stated above, the idea of a human destiny beyond physical death is speculative
in nature. However, it seems clear that there are several conditions which need to be met
in order for such a notion to be philosophically coherent and rationally plausible. For the
purpose of this thesis, three such conditions will be explored. The first condition
concems whether a human destiny beyond physical death allows human nature to be
fulfilled. The ability of an existence beyond death to fulfill human nature was addressed
in the previous segment. However, those modem metaphysical materialists, like Skirmer,
who assume that human nature is primarily oriented toward reproduction through the
process of natural selection, ignore without sufficient cause the reality of the human drive
to fiilfill those natural transcendent desires discussed in the previous section. The reason
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for abandoning these ideas is based on the notion that they cannot be studied or
confirmed scientifically. However, this is not a valid argument for two reasons. First,
whereas Aquinas takes seriously the idea that it is at least possible for human nature to be
totally fulfilled in all of its most basic desires and then argues logically to show that this
is, in fact, possible, the materialist fails to even rationally engage any alternative to the
view he has chosen. It was shown in Chapter 4 that science, though quite successful in
understanding physical reality, is unable to account for the universal human experience of
libertarian freedom. The materialist avoids the problem by ignoring it, by denying that
libertarian freedom exists, despite his inability to demonstrate such an assertion. Such
reasoning does not provide much philosophical coherence or confidence in its
conclusions. Assuming away logical problems by assuming away whole categories of
existence may simplify argumentation, but only at the cost of fatally weakening the
argument if the physicalist assumption is false. By contrast, Aquinas bases his position
on objective human experience. It is objective because the desire of a rational creature to
fulfill his nature is a universal experience in the human species. Second, Aquinas's
position is based on sound biblical and philosophical argumentation. In the medieval
world ofAquinas, the "biblical notion of the intimate coimection between body and spirit
had largely been forgotten as Christianity moved into the world ofHellenistic
philosophy."''* However, Aquinas, deeply concemed with a proper theological
understanding of the nature of humanity, retums to the biblical notion which emphasizes
that "paradise is no disembodied, purely intellectual state of affairs; on the contrary, it is
Robert Barron, Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master. (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 142.
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richly imagined as the blissful fulfillment of the totality of human being."^' Turning to
the modem world, many materialists assume the tmth of certain premises without proper
evidence and simply ignore those that support dualistic notions, hi contrast, Aquinas
carefully lays out his argument in specific terminology which corresponds to both human
experience and valid logical reasoning. Not surprisingly, his conclusions conceming the
ability of human nature to be fulfilled continues to have persuasive power. Again,
because of the speculative nature of this discussion, it is impossible for anyone to prove
absolutely that a destiny beyond death does actually exist. However, Aquinas's argument
does, in fact, demonstrate that such a transcendent existence could fulfill human nature.
The second condition for a coherent and defensible argument for human destiny
concems the integrity of the personal identity of the individual after the death of the
body. In contrast to substance dualism (Plato and Descartes), Aquinas did not believe
that a personal identity was reductively equal to an individual's soul. Rather, a human
being is a unified creature, composed of both body and soul. For Aquinas, "my soul is
not I.""*^ As Davies summarizes, "the existence of a human soul apart from what is
bodily is unnatural.""*' This is because, in the words ofAquinas:
It belongs to the very essence of the soul to be united to a body, just as it belongs
to a light body to float upwards. And just as a light body remains light when
forcibly displaced, and thus retains its aptitude and tendency for the location
proper to it, in the same way the human soul, remaining in its own existence after
separation from the body, has a natural aptitude and a natural tendency to
embodiment."*^
"Barron, 148-149.
*� Super I ad Cor. 15. Cf. Davies, 216.
Davies, 217.
"' ST I, 76, 1.
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Therefore, by its nature, the soul naturally belongs to the body, as the form of the body.
For Aquinas, the death of the body implies that the body has lost its form - the first
principle of its life.'*^ However, though the body is capable ofperishing, the human soul,
being subsistent, cannot perish. "On Aquinas's account, therefore, the human soul can
only be said to survive as something purely intellectual, as the locus of thought or will."'*^
For Aquinas, the rational nature of the human soul (having both an intellect and a will)
requires that it be immortal. Aquinas defends the validity of this position in another
passage which deserves to be quoted in full.
As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all the powers of the soul belong to the
soul as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject;
as the intellect and the will. These powers must remain in the soul after the
destruction of the body. But other powers are in the composite as their subject, as
all the powers of the sensitive nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after
the destruction of the subject. Therefore, when the composite is destroyed, such
powers do not remain actually: but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their
principle or root."*^
Given this, the question still remains as to how personal identity can be
transferred, since Aquinas maintains that the soul is not the totality of the human person.
In other words, personal identity requires bodily continuity. For a human person to live
again, according to Aquinas, soul must be united to a body, but not just any body. "The
soul of an ox caimot be the soul of a horse's body, nor can the soul of this ox be the soul
of any other ox. Therefore, since the rational soul that survives remains numerically the
same ... it must be reunited to numerically the same matter."'*^ How can such a thing be
ST I, 75, 1.
Davies, 216
STl, 77, 8.
CT 1, 153. While a student, Aquinas was referred to by other students as the "Dumb Ox" - a thought
which must have caused him to smile while writing this line.
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accomplished if the body is destroyed? To answer this Aquinas appeals to doctrine of the
resurrection of the dead. For Aquinas, the resurrection of the body and its reunion with
the soul will accomplish three things. First, it will satisfy the desire of the soul to be
united with the body."*' Second, it will allow the rational creature to experience
happiness, which is the natural desire of any creature.
Since therefore the natural condition of the soul is to be united to the body, it has
a natural desire for union with the body. Hence, the will cannot be perfectly at
rest until the soul is again joined to the body .... Therefore the human being's
final happiness requires the soul to be again united to the body."**
The third thing Aquinas's position accomplished is to maintain bodily continuity.
Aquinas writes, "[a]t the resurrection the soul will not resume a celestial or ethereal body,
or the body of some animal .... No, it will resume a human body made up of flesh and
bones, and equipped with the same organs it now possesses.""*' Aquinas does not offer
speculation as to the maimer in which this may be accomplished. What Aquinas does
assert is that such an action is outside the capability of nature. Therefore, Aquinas's
position on the continuity of personal identity that results from the resurrection of the
dead requires a supernatural act on the part of God. Aquinas "is absolutely clear that
such numerical identity is needed if I am to live again, and, given his belief in the power
ofGod, he flnds no objection in principle to believing that it can be brought about.
Though speculative in nature, Aquinas's position is both philosophically coherent, and
rationally defensible.
Barron, 149.
CT 1, 151.
Ibid.
Davies, 219.
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The third condition concems whether the human soul is able to have knowledge
while separated from the body. In dealing with this issue Aquinas draws upon the
previous discussions. Because a human is a united being, the rational soul is necessary
for knowledge because the soul is the locus of the intellect and will.^' Yet, it would seem
that the physical body is also necessary for knowledge because, for Aquinas, all human
knowledge is mediated through the senses. In other words, "our knowledge derives from
and is dependent on the fact that we are sensing beings."^^ Aristotle believed that
because the intellect and will were interior principles of an individual, they dissolved
along with the body at death. However, Aquinas maintains that the rational soul is
capable of knowledge after the death of the body. He provides two key reasons for this.
First, Aquinas asserts that powers of the intellect and the will do not belong to a rational
soul as its interior principles, rather, they belong to the rational soul as its subject.
For by soul we mean that whereby the thing having life lives, so it must be
understood as existing in a subject, taking subject here in a broad sense according
to which not only what actually exists is called a subject, as an accident is said to
be in a subject, but prime matter too is called a subject. The body which receives
life is rather the subject or matter than what exists in a subject.^"*
This difficult quote can be made more intelligible by recalling that, for Aquinas, a
principle is a source, or that from which something proceeds, while a subject, in
metaphysical terms, is a substance in relation to attributes. Basically, Aquinas is arguing
that the intellect and the will are not accidental (that is, non-essential), because they are
' Davies, 216.
Ibid., 43.
ST I, 77, 8.
Aquinas, Commentarv on the De Anima. Book Two. Lesson 1. Quoted by Ralph Mclnemy, A First
Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas: A Handbook for Peeping Thomists. (Notre Dame: University ofNotre
Dame Press, 1990), 122.
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the fundamental attributes of the rational soul in human beings.
Second, as established in Chapter 2 and defended in Chapter 3, the intellect is
based on an immaterial substance, and not on a material substance. Therefore, though the
material body dissolves after death, the human intellect remains because it is based on an
immaterial substance. Mclnemy comments, "Aristotle and Aquinas pin their
philosophical arguments that the human soul can exist independently of the body after
death on the character of thinking. The nature of thinking lifts the human soul, although
it is the substantial form a living body, free from the confining and restricting
consequences ofmatter.
"^^
An additional issue related to this discussion should be addressed briefly.
Aquinas believed that knowledge acquired in this life is retained after the death of the
body on the basis that "knowledge resides in the intellect."" Further, though the state of
the separated soul is not the same as in its union with a body, "it follows that through the
intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what
CO
it understood formerly, but in a different way." Aquinas does not show a separated soul
can have knowledge apart from sense images. However, it follows from his position that
the immaterial intellect, being the basis for knowledge, survives the death of the body.
These three conditions - the ability of human nature to be fulfllled, the
continuance of personal identity, and the separated soul's ability to have knowledge - are
In other words, "the human soul is the first principle of human, rational life, i.e., knowing and
willing." Kreeft, A Summa of the Summa. 29.
'^Mclnemy, 128-129.
" ST I, 89, 5.
5* ST I, 89, 6.
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necessary factors in order for the notion of a human destiny beyond physical death to be
an intelligible idea. Though not incontrovertibly established, this segment has
demonstrated that these issues are philosophically coherent and rationally defensible
under Aquinas's understanding of the nature (its immateriality and immortality) and
powers (the intellect and the will) of the rational human soul.
Two Opposing Positions on Human Destinv
So far, this chapter has explored human destiny as the fulfillment of universal
human aspirations, and examined several conditions necessary for human destiny to be
considered a plausible theory. Attention will now be given to two objections conceming
Aquinas's conception of human destiny. The first objection, which comes from the
philosopher Richard Swinbume, is based on a different theoretical foundation for the
immortality of the soul. The second objection, which comes from particle physicist John
Polkinghome, approaches the issue from an avowedly Thomistic perspective, though he
opposes the view that the soul survives the death of the body. These two positions will
be analyzed and then evaluated.
Swinbume's complex and well-argued solution to the mind-body problem is
approached from the position of substance dualism. That is, that human beings consist of
two distinct and separate substances - body and soul. Thus, Swinbume agrees with
Aquinas on a number of issues related to the mind-body problem, such as the immaterial
nature and basis of human consciousness, and the libertarian freedom of the will. Despite
the close proximity of their positions, however, Swinbume disagrees with Aquinas
conceming the human soul's ability to survive the death of the body. Swinbume believes
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that, at death, the soul ceases to function, because the human soul is dependent on the
brain for operation.^'
Therefore, in light of the difference between Swinbume and Aquinas conceming
the destiny of the soul, two main contrasting elements between their positions need to be
identified and evaluated. The first element is that Swinbume maintains that the
immaterial substance of the soul is what is essential to the nature of a human individual.
For Swinbume, "[sjince the body which is presently yours could have been mine (logic
and even natural laws allow), that shows that none of the matter ofwhich my body is
presently made is essential to my being the person that I am." The second element is
that Swinbume disagrees with Aquinas's position that the soul of any being (whether
vegetative, sensitive, or rational) is the principle of its behavior (or the form of its body).
Rather, Swinbume conceives the soul as a distinctive part of an organism.^' From these
two contrasting elements, Swinbume believes that because the brain is a necessary
component in order for the soul to function, the body is necessary in order for the soul to
fiinction. Therefore, Swinbume concludes, "[w]e need a form of dualism which brings
out that the soul does not have a nature so as to fimction on its own." For this reason,
Swinburne finds Aquinas's position to be inadequate. However, this thesis contends that
Swinbume, The Evolution of the Soul, l""* ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 298.
*� Ibid., 153.
^' Ibid., 183.
" Ibid., 176. Swinbume analogizes the soul with a light bulb plugged into a light socket, which stands
for the body. The only way for the light bulb to shine (function) is for it to be plugged into a non-damaged
socket. In this way, the soul is inert, and has no mental life. It follows that Swinbume could argue that the
soul does "survive" the death of body. However, any such existence is only in potential, and not actual.
Swinbume's position sounds very similar to the concept of "soul sleep." Cf The Evolution of the Soul.
310-311.
" Ibid., 306.
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this is what Aquinas's position entails. Recall that, for Aquinas, the soul is naturally
linked to the body which it animates. Once the soul is removed, the body ceases to
function because its principle of life is gone. The soul, however, though it may continue,
caimot function properly as a soul in respect of its cardinal powers - knowledge and will.
What Aquinas leaves open, and what it would seem Swinbume wishes to deny, is the
ability for these powers to function in a way that is not natural to the soul, but continues
in such a way that the personal identity of the individual is protected. The only reason
Swinbume offers for why this could not be the case is the unified nature of a human
individual as a creature comprised of both body and soul. He writes;
Aquinas tried to make provision in his system for the normal embodiedness of
men by claiming that the soul separated from its body 'is not a man.' But,
although lacking its bodily expression and source of knowledge, the soul is still
the subject of action and experience, and thus, in my terminology, a person.
Hence, even in Aquinas's system, what we value most about men has a natural
immortality; and this seems to jar with the biblical affirmation.^"*
Swinbume desires his understanding of the mind-body problem to closely connect with
the Scriptural doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. However, Swinbume seems to
miss Aquinas's point. As established above, Aquinas maintains that the natural condition
of a person is a unified being, with the rational soul being the form of the human body.
For Aquinas, the doctrine of the resurrected body establishes that the soul needs to be
reunited to its body in order for its fundamental nature to be fulfilled, in accordance with
human experience of the need for a body and the Scriptural doctrine of the resurrection of
the body. In other words, Swinbume's objection to Aquinas's position is actually solved
in Aquinas's position. Of course, this does not demonstrate that Swinbume's position is
Swinbume, 311-312.
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incorrect. However, it does illustrate that Aquinas's position is both rationally
defensible, and coincides with Scripture, despite Swinbume's assertion that it is not.
The second contrasting position to be examined in this chapter is that of John
Polkinghome. By his own admission, Polkinghome approaches the mind-body problem
from a generally Thomistic perspective.^^ He provides a more detailed description of his
position when he writes:
My understanding of the soul is that it is the almost infinitely complex, dynamic,
information-bearing pattem, carried at any instant by the matter ofmy animated
body and continuously developing throughout all the constituent changes ofmy
bodily make-up during the course ofmy earthly life.^^
Accordingly, "[m]y soul is the real me, but that is neither a spiritual entity temporarily
housed in the physical husk ofmy body, nor is it just the matter that makes up that
body." Instead, the soul is the form (or information-bearing pattem) of the body. What
is interesting about Polkinghome's position is that, like Swinburne, he disagrees with
Aquinas's belief that the soul survives the death of the body. Of course, Polkinghome is
not saying that physical death is the end of a person. Indeed, "an indispensable part of
CO
coherent Christian belief is to expect a destiny beyond death." Rather, Polkinghome
insists that the soul is "dissolved at death by the decay of the body."^' Polkinghome's
hope for a human destiny beyond death is based on his assertion that "it is a perfectly
Polkinghome states that his "view of the soul that I have been trying to express would not have
surprised St Thomas Aquinas." John Polkinghome, Bevond Science: The Wider Human Context.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 61. However, his view is more closely associated with
that ofAristotle, which is discussed on page 109 of this chapter.
John Polkinghome, The Faith of a Physicist. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 163.
" Polkinghome, Beyond Science. 61.
John Polkinghome, Quarks. Chaos and Christianity. (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 95.
Polkinghome, The Faith of a Physicist. 163.
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coherent hope that the pattem that is me will be remembered by God and its instantiation
will be recreated by him when he reconstitutes me in a new enviroimient of his choosing.
That will be his eschatological act of resurrection."'" Polkinghome submits two reasons
for belief in the doctrine of the future resurrection of the body. The first reason is
theological. Since God is ultimately powerful, it follows that God is capable of
accomplishing such a feat, despite the inability of the human mind to conceive how it
could be accomplished. Further, God is ultimately good. "God does not just cast us off
as discarded broken pots, thrown on to the mbbish heap of the universe when we die.
Our belief in a destiny beyond death rests in the loving faithfulness of the etemal God.""
The second reason is historical. Polkinghome understands the historical act of
Christ's resurrection from the dead to give a glimpse into the prospective destiny of
humanity. In addition, Polkinghome views the historical act of the creation of the
universe as alluding to an eventual historical act of rebirth and renewal of the universe.
He writes, "the new creation is the divine redemption of the old." Polkinghome then
connects these two elements of his historical argument together. "The resurrection of
Jesus is the beginning within history of a process whose fulfillment lies beyond history,
in which the destiny of humanity and the destiny of the universe are together to find their
� Polkinghome, The Faith of a Physicist. 163. Apparently, Polkinghome believes that God, based on
his perfect memory, will reassemble particles into a new form, which will happen to retain the soul of an
individual. Recall that Polkinghome is a particle physicist, and that when all you have is a hammer all
problems appear to be nails.
^' Polkinghome, Quarks. Chaos and Christianity. 92.
Polkinghome. The Faith of a Physicist 167.
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fulfillment in a liberafion from decay and futility."'^ Hence, "the Christian hope is of
death and resurrection."^"^
Nevertheless, despite the reasonableness of his argument, Polkinghome's position
suffers from the problem of several unanswered questions. The first one can be
established by examining two elements of Aquinas and Polkinghome's positions. First,
like Polkinghome, Aquinas believes that a human being is a union of both body and soul.
"The body is not the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be
united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the composite, is the
species."'^ Second, Aquinas agrees with Polkinghome's position that the future
resurrection of the body is the culmination of human destiny.'^ This illustrates that
Aquinas recognizes, along with Polkinghome, the explicit need for the restoration of the
body along with the physcial world. As Barron writes, "[t]o bring the gmbby flesh right
into the heart of the beatiflc vision is one ofAquinas's humanist masterstrokes."'' Yet,
following Polkinghome's reasoning, it is difflcult to understand how personal identity
could be maintained at the resurrection without the immortality of the soul. He writes,
"[o]ur hope is of the resurrection of the body. By that I do not mean the resuscitation of
our present stmcture."'* Of course, Aquinas does not believe this either. The only way
in which this seems plausible is ifGod, who will redesign each individual at the
" Polkinghome, The Faith of a Physicist. 164.
'"Ibid., 163.
" ST I, 75, 7.
Cf CG 4, 79, 6.
" Barron, 175.
Polkinghome, The Faith of a Physicist. 164.
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resurrection of the dead, remembers the form of each individual. This is a plausible
notion. However, a more thoroughgoing Thomistic position is preferable for two
reasons. First, it provides a rational argument for personal identity based on principles
that are accessible by reason, and does not force one to appeal to mystery in order to
solve the problem. Second, it solves the problem of ambiguity conceming what essential
physical parts of the individual need to be created or reformed at the resurrection in order
for personal identity to remain intact.
However, another question remains to consider. If, as Polkinghome alleges, the
soul is the form of the present body, how can personal identity be continued when God
"reconstitutes" each individual at the resurrection? Polkinghome asserts that the soul is
the form of this present body, while also maintaining that the resurrection will be a result
ofGod remembering those pattems, and remaking them. Aquinas's basis for the
immortality of the soul, one which is not explicitly or implicitly contradicted by
Polkinghome's position, is a more logically consistent position. It corresponds to "the
facts of human existence," and solves the logical conundrum of how personal identity can
continue between the death of the body and the resurrection of the dead. In this manner,
Aquinas's position on human destiny answers problems both theoretical and practical.
Further, Polkinghome does not provide an adequate reason for abandoning this aspect of
the Thomistic perspective on human destiny. Of course, this does not make his position
incorrect. Yet, it does leave his position vulnerable to attack by materialists who would
maintain that Polkinghome's position is similar to theirs with an added bit of hopeful
theology to lift the spirit.
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This chapter has presented three arguments in favor of a human destiny beyond
the death of the body. The first segment argued that certain human aspirations (ultimate
justice and morality, a purpose and meaning to life, and the quest for happiness), which
are shared by various cultures, religions, ages, and geography, strongly suggests that it is
possible for a human to survive after the death of the physical body. The second segment
argued that certain conditions (the ability of human nature to be fiilfilled, the continuation
of personal identity after physical death, and the separated human soul's ability to have
knowledge) were provided for in Aquinas's position on human destiny, and that this
position was philosophically coherent and rationally defensible. The third segment
explored two different opinions on the basis for an existence beyond the death of the
body. It was shown that, though the others are plausible, Aquinas's position is both
rationally and theologically defensible, and corresponds to the reality of human
experience, and should be preferred.
It was stated in Chapter 1 that many in the current mind-body debate have ignored
Aquinas's proposed solution to the mind-body problem. Despite the assertion that it is
"difficult to pin down," this thesis has demonstrated that Aquinas's position is clear,
coherent, comprehensive, and even contemporary. Aquinas's solution continues to
correspond to recent neurophysiological discoveries, as well as tried-and-true
philosophical analysis. Indeed, as Maritain declared, "Thomism is not a museum
Qf\
piece." Quite the contrary, the findings of this thesis suggests that Aquinas's composite
dualism is a more plausible solution to the mind-body problem than those offered by the
Lynne Rudder Baker, "Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Duahst?" Faith and Philosophv 12 no. 4
(Oct. 1995), 503.
*�
Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphvsics. (Salem, NH: Ayer, 1987), 9.
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hard materialist, soft materialist, or substance dualist. Clearly, Aquinas's proposed
solution to the mind-body problem deserves a complete and honest hearing in the wider
discussion of the mind-body debate.
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